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51 Introduction
Opinions on whether developing economies should open up to trade or engage in pro-
tectionism dier greatly. The body of theory and evidence on this question oers no
straightforward answer. Not only can it be tedious to disentangle eects of techno-
logical change and increasing trade openness that at times took place simultaneously
and are interconnected, but there are also many aspects to consider. Wages are one
dominant aspect which are themselves multifaceted. Trade can aect wages and em-
ployment through dierent channels at the country level, the industry level and at the
rm level, and these eects do not always work in the same direction. The relationship
of trade and wages at the rm level is one important part of the whole picture. In this
work, a sample of 2738 manufacturing companies drawn from UNIDO's Africa Investor
Survey 2010 (Organization (2010)) database on 20 sub-Saharan African countries, some
of them surveyed for the rst time, is used to gain some insight into the rm-level re-
lationship of trade and wages. The analysis considers the impact of direct imports of
intermediate inputs and exports on the wages of production and non-production work-
ers as well as on relative wages at the conditional mean using OLS and at dierent
points of the wage distribution using quantile regression.
Furthermore, decomposition methods are employed to test for dierences in the wage-
setting function between companies that trade and those that do not. To the best of
my knowledge, although there are prominent examples of applications of decomposi-
tion methods to the wage structure eects of technological change and dispersion of
education premia within groups of workers with the same educational characteristics
(see Lemieux (2006) and Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993)), there has been no such
approach to the eect of trade on wages at the rm level.
Section 2 gives a short review of trade theory and wage theory, and discusses theo-
retical and empirical works on the relationship of trade and wages with emphasis on
studies at the rm-level. Section 3 lays out the research question in detail. Section 4
gives an overview of the methodology applied in this work. Section 5 discusses the data
set, descriptive statistics and simple hypothesis tests. Section 6 discusses the regression
and decomposition results. Section 7 concludes.
62 Theory and empirical evidence
The relationship of trade and wages is rather complex. Neoclassical trade theory
draws on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem derived from the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
The Heckscher-Ohlin model analyses trade between two countries that dier in en-
dowments. The model predicts that trade will induce a country to export goods the
production of which is intensive in the country's abundant factor and import goods
the production of which is intensive in the use of the country's scarce factor. The
Stolper-Samuelson theorem concludes that this will result in an increase in relative
earnings of the abundant factor and a decrease in relative earnings of the scarce factor.
Hence, it predicts that trade between industrialised countries and developing countries
will increase wages in developing countries whilst increasing the price of capital and
decreasing wages in industrialised countries. Trade between countries that dier in
skill-endowments is seen to increase the price of low-skilled labour in the low-skilled
labour abundant country exporting goods intensive in this factor and to decrease the
price of low-skilled labour in the low-skilled labour scarce country. Trade between coun-
tries diering in skill-endowments is therefore considered to decrease wage inequality
in developing countries and increase wage inequality in industrialised countries.
These theoretical considerations, however, have not been conrmed empirically
(for recent work on the topic see Zhu and Treer, 2005)1.
Haskel, Lawrence, Leamer, and Slaughter (2012) criticise that, although two goods |
two skill-level models might have been more appropriate in the past, they are not par-
ticularly helpful nowadays in explaining trajectories of wage inequality.
Extensions to the Heckscher-Ohlin framework have been proposed to model a more
complex interplay of factor prices, goods prices and dierences in endowments. The
most notable examples are the modelling of love-of-variety, technological change and
trade induced innovation. A crucial point is that starting in the 1980's, models that
account for rm heterogeneity have become more common and have been able to ex-
plain intra-industry trade ((Melitz and Treer, 2012)) and the fact that some rms in
an industry engage in international trade and some do not. These models state that
dierent rms react in a dierent way to the host country opening up to trade. This
argument has been able to explain considerable variation in wages and trade volumes
that occur even within very narrowly dened industry sectors. Furthermore, models
1They use the Freeman and Oostendorp (2001) occupational wage database that contains data on
the relative wages of production and nonproduction workers for the 1990's for 20 developing and newly
industrialised countries to demonstrate that trade has not reduced wage inequality in a great part of
these countries
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that go beyond the static Heckscher-Ohlin framework have been able to solve some
major contradictions between theory and empirics.
2.1 Wage Theory
Why would trade have an inuence on wages other than by changing factor prices
at the market level? Theory and empirics point to dierent reasons for rent-sharing
between rms and their employees 2. If trade is related to productivity levels and prof-
its, rent-sharing would form a link between trade and wage levels. At the rm level,
whether a rm engages in trade and its trade volumes would be one determinant of
wage levels. If rms heterogeneity is the reason why some rms in the same market
engage in trade and some do not, rent-sharing could be a reason for variation in wages
between these rms. Major theoretical examples of dierent forms of rent sharing are
eciency wage theory, contract theory and fair wages theory.
Eciency wage theory
Eciency wage theory argues that wages above the competitive equilibrium level are
paid to increase labour productivity. One reason put forward is that more skilled and
more productive employees should be attracted with wages above the equilibrium level
(cf. Fehr and Gchter, 1998). Higher wages can also be a way to reduce labour force
turnover and to secure that benets of employee training can be reaped. High wages
can be intended to raise the costs of losing a position, and thereby motivate employ-
ees to put more eort into their work. At the same time, high wages are seen as a
means to prevent them from switching to another company, thus taking rm specic
knowledge with them which might benet a competitor and making it necessary to
train a new employee. This is the more costly the higher the employee's position and
the more specic her qualications. This is why productivity and indirectly anything
inuencing wages over productivity might have a higher ceteris paribus inuence on
the wages of qualied employees, those with very specic qualications and those with
important knowledge of rm-specic processes and innovations, i.e. a combination of
their education, their position and their experience within the rm.
2Rent-sharing means that prots made by a rm are shared with its workers to some extent.
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Contract theory
A key feature of an employer-employee relationship is observability and veriability
of the employee's eort. If eort is not veriable, that is, if evidence on eort is not
available, the rst best contract of paying according to eort is not feasible. Under
uncertainty, the optimal contract with payment according to outcome must both sat-
isfy the constraint that it must be better than the agent's outside option and induce
him to exert the desired eort level. The reason is the moral hazard problem involved
with this form of asymmetric information. With the agent's marginal costs of eort
suciently high or the degree of observability of his eort level (how well his actions
can be monitored and the probability with which a given eort level yields a certain
outcome) suciently low, the agent gets an information rent with the optimal piece
rate contract. Generally speaking, eort is very hard to verify in high-skilled tasks and
less observable the more demanding the task. This is an argument for wage premia to
be higher for more skill intensive positions as well.
Another explanation for wages to be higher with rm- and individual employee produc-
tivity that also considers observability is given by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). They
argue that higher wages are used to introduce a higher penalty for shirking and thus to
induce employees to be more productive in an environment where there is incomplete
control over their behaviour. Hence, the less eort is observable for a certain position,
the higher the wage. This hits a similar vein as the general eciency wages theory im-
plications: the expected cost of shirking is intended to be increased with higher wages
when the probability to be laid o on these grounds is very low.
Fair Wages
Akerlof (1982) proposes a model in which fair wages are considered as a form of partial
gift exchange. This view was motivated by anecdotical evidence of wages above the
equilibrium level and eort substantially above the level formally required observed
in the absence of motivation by promotion and signicant wage bargaining power by
employees performing rather low-skilled tasks. Hence, in the model, wage premia are
paid in exchange for eort above the formally agreed level. This includes less able
agents as well because agents stand in for each other and more able agents make up
for others failing to meet their targets.
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These theories complement rather than contradict each other. As each of them sug-
gests, whether rents are shared and how this happens may vary with the specic re-
quirements of the workplace, the possibility of monitoring and workers' bargaining
position, notably unemployment, labour laws and contract enforceability. In empirical
analyses, a relationship between productivity and wages has been largely conrmed in
various contexts, as well as considerable premia for education and positions that involve
more responsibility and are thus more demanding and are up to the agent's discretion
to a greater degree. Support for the notion of fair wages is also oered. Individual
utility maximization and wage bargaining alone cannot oer a general explanation for
bonuses that are well known to be an important feature of many managers' contracts.
Fehr and Schmidt (2004b) explore this issue in an experimental setting. Bonus pay-
ments cannot be enforced by the agent after the costs of high eort have been incurred,
so a principal that only acts out of self-interest will not have an incentive to pay a bonus
and the agent knows this. This holds in a one-shot game and in a nitely repeated
game by backward induction. In the experiment, principals can design a piece rate or
oer a bonus contract and agents decide on an eort level for two dierent tasks. The
tasks are complementary for the principal, but while eort spent on both is perfectly
observable, only eort spent on task two is veriable. This characterises many work
situations. The amount of goods produced or services provided may be veriable, but
not so their quality or the presence of a good relationship with a customer. Even in
the one-shot game, a bonus contract works much better in making the agent spend
equal eort on both tasks although average aggregate eort levels are not signicantly
dierent from piece rate contracts, but bonus contracts pareto dominate piece rate con-
tracts. Even though some principals oer high xed rates with the piece rate contract
which also could be seen as an appeal to the agent's fairness, many agents choose min-
imal eort levels for the second task. Whilst bonuses outperform piece rates, not all
agents oered bonuses chose high eort levels for the second task. No principal chose
a trust contract with a piece rate of 0 and a generous xed wage that may also induce
reciprocity.3 Fehr and Schmidt (2004b) explain these observations with their theory
of inequity aversion((see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999)) that features heterogenous players
with some being very concerned about inequity and some purely self-interested, the
interaction of which is crucial for the interpretation. Inequity-averse agents faced with
a signicant probability of being matched with a selsh principal fear the suering from
inequity additional to the loss of eort costs and expend minimal eort with a bonus
3Such a contract performed very poorly in a setting where the alternative was the possibility of
a punishment for bad performance (Fehr and Schmidt, 2004a). This could be taken as an argument
against fair wages as described by Akerlof (1982), but again, this may depend on the context such as
the personal relationship between employer and employee and whether the game can be considered
as innitely repeated.
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contract ((Fehr and Schmidt, 2004b)). In real life settings, however, this may be very
dierent with ex ante communication and the possibility of screening4 and signalling 5.
One example of an experimental exploration of the concept of guilt aversion is provided
by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) who assume that decision makers' utility suers
from the feeling that they have let someone down. They nd support for the related
notion that even without strategic uncertainty, strategies depend on beliefs about the
beliefs of others which can be formed and sharpened by communication | nding that
in a game with hidden action where reciprocity is no Nash Equilibrium 6 if players
are purely self-interested, reciprocity can occur based on beliefs about the partner's
credibility, with communication being a way of signalling.
2.2 Theory and empirics of trade, productivity and wages
Trade and factor prices
The impact of trade on factor prices is an issue to be considered when doing analysis at
the rm level as more rms that trade are likely to be observed in industries that are
more internationally oriented in a randomly drawn sample even though factor prices
are not the major identiable force behind wage dierences between traders and non-
traders in the same industry. Insuciently controlling for industry sectors may thus
bias results on the rm level. Furthermore, it is worth having a look at the general
trade and wages literature (which departs from the simplifying assumption of homoge-
nous rms) because eects that can be made out at the country or industry level may
well be able to explain dierences between traders and non-traders within the same
market segment.
Zhu and Treer (2005) derive a general equilibrium model building on a combination
of the Ricardian model of international technology dierences by
Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) with the Heckscher-Ohlin model
(Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson, 1980), in which, as industrialising economies catch
4The principal oering a contract that is only attractive for agents willing or able to exert a certain
level of eort.
5A player takes some ex ante action tied to some cost that reveals she is incentivised to play the
equilibrium the other player favours. This could be for example someone studying for an academic
degree and thereby signalling that he is able to exert high eort.
6None of the players has an incentive to deviate given the other player's strategy
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up in terms of technology, the least skill-intensive goods so far produced in industri-
alised countries become the most skill-intensive goods so far produced in industrialised
countries become the most skill-intensive goods produced in industrialising countries.
This predicts rising demand for skills and thus rising wage inequality in both indus-
trialised and developing economies, a mechanism which is empirically conrmed by
linear regression analysis using both ordinary least squares and instrumental variable
estimation on the Freeman and Oostendorp (2001) data.
At a more general level, Krugman has become well known for his formal analysis of
intra-industry trade that builds on increasing returns to scale and monopolistic compe-
tition through product dierentiation (Krugman, 1979). This model was transformed
using less restrictive assumptions in later works (see for example Krugman (1980) and
Brander and Krugman (1983)), thus validating the model's predictions for a more gen-
eral setting. With product dierentiation and imperfect substitution, rms compete
monopolistically within their market segment. Therefore, with increasing returns to
scale, it is protable to access a bigger market, i.e. to export. Hence, trade and gains
from trade can be observed even when the economies between which trade occurs are
identical in factor endowments, preferences and technology. It has been pointed out
that consumers benet from a larger variety of goods as do rms from a larger vari-
ety of inputs (for an early formal analysis of welfare losses because of reduced variety
through taris see Romer, 1994).
There has been an intense discussion among labour and trade economists regarding
the extent to which the increase in wage inequality in the U.S. and in several other
countries can be attributed to trade or technological change. In the ninetees, authors
like Katz and Murphy (1992) and Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) suggested that
technological change is the main driving force behind the increase in inequality on the
basis of estimations taking account of both technological change and increase in ag-
gregate trade volumes. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) in their central paper, develop a
two-stage regression to isolate eects of trade on factor prices that is based on the
approach by Leamer (1996). In the rst stage, factor prices and productivity are re-
gressed on structural variables such as trade and technology. In the second stage, the
obtained estimates are regressed on factor shares. The resulting estimates yield the
change in factor prices explained by the respective structural variable. Using U.S. data
for the 1980's, they nd that about 25% of the increase in the relative wages of non-
production workers is due to oshoring, 30% are through technological change. Their
famous article has further heatened the discussion and stimulated various applications
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and extension to their approach. Hijzen (2007) provides an extension to distinguish
between factor and sector bias by making productivity and factor prices endogenous in
a two-stage procedure. He nds that, for explaining wage inequality in the UK during
the 1990s, the sector bias played a much larger role than the factor bias of international
outsourcing, while the factor bias was slightly larger for technological change.
Findings on the sector and country level are important for the present work in the
following way: If trade induces technological change, the channels over which this
happens may be visible at the market level - imported high-tech intermediates are
available to all rms through wholesellers and competition fostered by an increase in
trade openness can be felt by all rms. But rms interacting directly with a for-
eign trade partner or a company that sells its products on a foreign market are likely
to be more directly and more intensely exposed to the impact that increased vari-
ety and technology level of intermediate inputs and increased competition may have.
Feenstra (2010) explains that productivity gains from oshoring acting like low-skilled
labour saving technical progress can be expected to have a positive eect on wages for
low-skilled labour whilst the price eect of an increase in world output of low-skilled
labour intensive is negative. Everything else remaining the same it depends on the size
of the country which eect dominates and whether realative wages of non-production
workers fall or rise. So again the question is whether it is low-skilled labour that
is oshored or high-skilled labour (acting like high-skilled labour saving technologi-
cal progress) (cf. Feenstra, 2010). The issue is further complicated by specialisation
being found to be incomplete (cf. Edwards and Lawrence, 2010). That technological
change can occur through trade as well again makes it harder to disentangle eects.
Burstein, Cravino, and Vogel (2011) develop a model in which international trade in
capital goods increases demand for skill by these capital goods being complementary
to skill, hence increasing wage inequality.
Applying the mandated wage approach of Feenstra and Hanson (1999),
Edwards and Lawrence (2010) show that the increase in U.S. wage inequality has not
been mandated by changes in developing-country import prices. They explain this
by the nding that highly disaggregated U.S. manufacturing industries that import
high shares of goods from developing economies are more skill-intensive than those
that import high shares of goods from developed economies. The authors' expla-
nation is the U.S. and developing economies having specialised in products being
highly imperfect substitutes. Another notable example for the impact of trade be-
tween countries diering in endowments being not at all straightforward to predict is
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Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004), who nd that the impact of tari reductions
in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s has been threefold: returns to colledge education
increased, industry wages chaned in a way that sectors with a higher proportion of
low-skilled workers and initially lower wages lost, and a shift of labour towards the
informal sector.
When talking about the impact of trade at the rm-level in so-called developing coun-
tries, the described ambiguity with respect to skill has to be borne in mind. This review
shows as well that it is important to distinguish the overall eect of trade that can be
measured by comparing countries or years with dierent degrees of openness to trade
or by comparing industries with dierent trade volumes from the eect of trade on
wages in rms that engage in trade. Assuming that single rms are not responsible for
a change in market wages, only the productivity eect but not the price eect can be
distinguished in an analysis at the rm-level. If trade is a reason for higher technology
levels at the rm-level, trading rms might be willing to pay more for high qualica-
tions if these are complementary to technology. There is no reason for them to pay
less for low-skilled labour. Rather, if technology is related to productivity and there
is some form of rent-sharing when it comes to production wages, these may well be
higher at trading rms. Hence, while the studies discussed in the previous section may
allow for the forces at work at the market level being a relevant factor for dierences
at the rm-level as well, the reasonings on the way these eects work are not generally
applicable here.
Trade at the rm-level
Several arguments provide support for trade at the rm level being associated with
absolute wage dierences. Whether it is also associated with higher wage dierences
between occupations with dierent skill levels, that is, higher qualication premia, is
less clear-cut and depends crucially on the channels over which trade is related to wages
and therefore is more closely tied to what is traded and with whom.
It has become common practice to answer the question why, in the same country
and industry sector, some rms or plants export and some do not by modeling rm
heterogeneity with dierent productivity levels and dierent costs of exporting. Recent
papers use and extend the framework of Melitz (2003) which was motivated by empirical
evidence for self selection of more productive rms into exporting (notably the con-
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tributions of Bernard and Bradford Jensen (1999), Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000),
andClerides, Lach, and Tybout (1996)) and the exposure to trade forcing the least
productive rms to exit the market (see for example (Aw et al., 2000). The Melitz
(2003) model is a general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition. In con-
trast with earlier models that incorporate trade costs, rms do not only incur a per
unit transport and transaction cost (which is as usually modeled as iceberg cost of
a fraction lost of each unit sold), but also a xed sunk cost for accessing a foreign
market additionally to the domestic market which are modeled independently of trade
volume decisions7. Productivity levels are allowed to vary without any distributional
restrictions. A transition from autarky to an open economy as well as further trade
liberalisation makes market entry more protable for the more productive rms. More
productive rms export and the cuto productivity level below which a rm does not
survive becomes higher as the domestic market share reduces for all rms. Thus, the
total number of rms declines and with the reallocation of market shares towards more
productive rms, average productivity increases whilst the most productive rms are
those that export. This result is particularly important as it is independent of increased
competition through imports.
Imports at the rm level have until recently been less extensively studied than ex-
ports, even less so the interplay of exports and imports. Kasahara and Lapham (2008)
develop a stochastic model with export and import complementarities. They extend
the Melitz (2003) model to importing intermediates which increases a rm's productiv-
ity because of increasing returns to variety in inputs and leads to a partitioning of the
mass of rms into a group of rms that import and a group that does not because of
a xed sunk cost involved with importing 8. Similar to the prediction of Melitz (2003)
for exports, this leads to intra-rm productivity gains for importers and an increase
in aggregate productivity. One important insight is that importing intermediates may
enable a rm to export as it becomes suciently productive to do so. When the returns
to importing intermediates are large enough, a rm that exports but does not import
may also lose market share through trade liberalisation and vice versa. As a result of
market reallocation to more productive rms, labour demand and equilibrium wages
rise with trade liberalisation. Kasahara and Lapham (2008) test their model using
plant level data on manufacturing plants in Chile from 1990-1996 and nd substan-
tial productivity dierences between exporters and non-exporters as well as between
7This xed sunk cost may comprise making the product known in the foreign market, getting
informed about and adhering to specic rules and regulations, setting up new distribution channels
etc.
8This sunk cost could include costs such as resources used for establishing relationships with foreign
sellers, search costs, transaction costs and transport costs etc.
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importers and non-importers. Importers are more productive even after controlling
for exports and vice versa. Costs of exporting/importing are modeled with stochas-
tic xed costs drawn in each period of exporting/importing and if a rm chooses to
export or import, it additionally draws choice-dependent cost shocks associated with
the export/import decision from the extreme-value distribution. They nd compelling
evidence for substantial sunk costs associated both with exporting and importing and
for a rm being able to save approximately 20 % of its sunk costs associated with
the trading decision in each period if it engages in export and import simultaneously
(Kasahara and Lapham, 2008, p.20).
Davis and Amiti (2012) combine this framework with the one of Melitz (2003) to model
the relationship of exports and imported intermediate inputs and wages at the rm
level. The relationship with wages is modelled by incorporating imperfect factor mar-
kets in which rent sharing between the rm and its workers occurs. They apply the
theory of fair wages proposed by Akerlof (1982) but stress that whilst some form of
rent-sharing is essential to their results, its precise form does not play a major role
(Davis and Amiti, 2012, p.3). They consider the concept of fair wages more suited
than eciency wages for the setting of developing economies, where a large low-skilled
workforce competes for jobs and wage bargaining cannot be a major concern for a
large fraction of jobs (Davis and Amiti, 2012, p.9). The impact of increased eort on
productivity and the reciprocity of this relationship forms the link between rm char-
acteristics and wages, thereby constituting a channel for trade to inuence wages and
vice versa. In their model, all workers at zero-prot rms earn the same wage, workers
at other rms are paid wages increasing in the protability of the rm. Bidding down
does not occur because workers are identical and any other hired worker will demand
the same wage. The two sectors of the economy are the intermediate goods sector
with a xed measure of varieties on the unit interval. Entry is free, returns to scale
are constant, and prices equal marginal costs. In order to allow for import and ex-
port shares to vary, additional heterogeneity parameters are introduced, that is, after
having incurred a sunk xed cost, rms receive a random draw of three parameters
that are distributed with a joint probability density function: the rm's productivity
in activities paid according to marginal cost, and idiosyncratic marginal import and
export costs. When the idiosyncratic marginal cost of importing is lower for some
rm, its productivity threshold for importing intermediates to pay o the sunk xed
cost are lower holding everything else xed. The setup for exports and its implications
are equivalent. Trade liberalisation is captured as the decrease of an iceberg import
cost component common to all rms in the market. With the elasticity of substitution
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between any two varieties of intermediate inputs set to be greater than one, marginal
costs are lower for an importing rm and it has access to a larger variety of inputs.
Revenues are lower in a foreign market due to iceberg costs, but total revenues of a rm
are increasing in export share because it serves a larger market. Hence, total revenue of
a rm is thus increasing in export and import shares, with exporting being complemen-
tary to importing. By rent-sharing, wages are increasing in revenues with decreasing
marginal returns when the trade status is held xed. This result holds with identical
preferences and endowments over countries. They test their model using an unbalanced
panel for Indonesia from 1991-2000 with industries classied at the ve-digit level and
nd a signicant positive link between trade status and wages, with importer-exporters
paying higher wages relative to one way traders. This eect is found to be robust to
selection and heterogeneity.
In an unpublished working paper, Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler, and Redding (2012)
explore unobserved dierences in workforce composition across rms by extending the
theoretical model of Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010). The latter model con-
siders heterogeneity in productivity as in Melitz (2003), but instead of homogenous
workers considers ex post match-specic heterogeneity in workers' abilities. By worker
ability being complementary to rm productivity and through higher returns to screen-
ing for larger rms, multi-lateral bargaining leads to a higher qualied workforce and
higher wages for exporters compared to non-exporters. Helpman et al. (2012) add a
cost of screening workers as well as heterogeneity in the size of the xed cost of export-
ing and predict that wage dispersion between rms is related to trade and size. The
model t is conrmed by matched employer-employee data for Brazil from 1986-1998.
A few theoretical and empirical works point towards an eect of trade on wage in-
equality when rm and/or worker heterogeneity are the focus of attention. The model
by Monte (2011) with heterogeneous technology and heterogeneous workers in which
abilities and the qualities of ideas are complementary predicts that changes to trade
costs have asymmetric eects on productive vs. less productive rms which leads to
higher wages for trading rms. An important feature of the model is that trade inte-
gration can lead to increasing wage ratios at the top of the distribution and to constant
or decreasing wage ratios at the bottom, which stresses the relevance of considering
more than the mean of the wage distribution. Intra-rm wage distribution is predicted
not to change with trade integration as the latter is allowed to aect wages over rents
reaped by the rm only, so it does not alter rent-sharing itself. This is similar to Yeaple
(2005), who shows that rms that are identical in the beginning become heterogeneous
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due to the scarcity of skilled labour when rms endogenously decide on the employ-
ment of dierent technologies and then hire workers of dierent types corresponding
to the decision on technology. Firms that employ better technology and more skilled
labour select into exporting when this is tied to a xed cost as the better technology
allows them to produce at lower unit cost. An export premium is also paid to produc-
tion workers. This suggests higher wage dispersion at the plant level for exporters as
found by Frias, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2012) for data on Mexico for 1993-2001. They
nd no eect of exporting on wages at the lower percentiles and an increasing eect
at higher percentiles but no increase in the eect from the 75th percentile onwards,
which the authors take as evidence for the increase of within-plant wage dispersion
not being exclusively caused by higher wages for top-managers. The theoretical model
of Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008) oers some possible explanations for this
nding. Similarly to Yeaple (2005), rms are identical ex ante, but there are high-
skilled and low skilled non-production workers. Technology can be basic or advanced,
the latter can only be managed by high-skilled managers. The model predicts that
the globalization decision has no eect on total factor productivity, but that wages of
high-skilled managers increase for both high and low technology rms as the surplus is
split and their bargaining power increases, whilst net gains of low-skilled managers may
be positive or negative as they are paid part of the surplus but lose some bargaining
power. High-skilled managers in high technology rms gain more from the rm's deci-
sion to export than high-skilled managers in low-tech rms. Their result could be taken
the other way around as well: High-skilled managers in an exporting rm gain more
from high technology than high-skilled managers in a rm only serving the domestic
market. Another potential factor for trade status altering the way in which other struc-
tural variables inuence wages could be the relationship between global engagement
and innovation activities of rms, as found by Criscuolo, Haskel, and Slaughter (2010)
for example, that would be complementary to skill and other channels hypothesised by
the assumption of learning by exporting 9.
3 Research Question
From the literature review, several hypotheses relevant to the analysis of cross section
data on the rm level emerge:
Firms that engage in international trade are generally larger in terms of sales than
9Learning by exporting or importing could mean that through the interaction with a foreign trade
partner, rms could gain access to more advanced technology but also get ideas on how to organise
production more eciently (cf. Clerides et al., 1996).
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rms that do not, they are more productive and have a higher qualied workforce than
rms that do not. This relationship may be connected to innovation and technology,
the latter term being understood in its broadest sense. If some form of rent-sharing
occurs, these rms also pay higher wages in general. If innovation and technology
are complementary to skill and rents are shared, the wages setting function may be
dierent according to trade status. If exporting and importing at the rm level are
complementary, wages should be higher for twoway traders than for those that only
either import or export.
Several features of the AIS data impose limitations on the estimation of the hypothe-
sised relationship. A cross-sectional structure and lack of instruments preclude reliable
separation of the direction of eects. Worker and occupational characteristics are
merely available at a minimum level: Only average monthly wages and working hours
were asked for workers in three occupational categories, that is production workers,
administrative or clerical employees and managerial or technical sta. The latter two
categories have been found to have been inconsistently distinguished by respondents
and therefore have to be lumped together. The white to blue collar ratio does provide
a measure of skill, but a very crude one. One major shortcoming of this as a measure
of skill intensity is that the more white collar workers a rm employs relative to total
employment, the more likely it is that some of them would not be very high skilled but
medium skilled.
Because of these features, skill-biasedness of trade resulting in disproportionately higher
wage inequality between production and nonproduction workers would thus not only
show in higher estimated skill premia for rms engaging in international trade, but
also in dierences in unobservables, that is, residuals would dier for traders and non-
traders. Coecients on the major candidates for forming a connection between trade
and wages, notably productivity, size, employment and technology level would also be
likely to dier. This would most likely be observed at the higher quantiles of the wage
distribution.
The following hypotheses are tested:
1. Wages are generally higher for rms that engage in trade. This eect is stronger
for twoway traders because of complementarity of importing and exporting. To
a large extent, these dierences in wages can be explained with size and produc-
tivity eects.
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2. The eect of rm trade on wages is stronger for more qualied workers. With
qualications insuciently controlled for, it is more strongly visible in the higher
quantiles of the wage distribution.
3. Therefore, wage ratios of non-production to production workers depend positively
on trade status. Skill premia paid by trading rms diering among rms with
lower skill premia would mean that the eects of trade on wage ratios dier over
quantiles as well. Trade being skill-biased and skill-biasedness mattering more
with a low initial skill-level would also show in dierent estimated eects over
the quantiles of the distribution of relative wages.
4. Skill-biasedness of trade and capital-skill as well as trade induced technological
change in the widest sense together with technology-skill complementarity and
therefore skill becoming more important for a trading rm would show in the
wage-setting function diering with respect to trade status. This dierence may
vary over quantiles as they reect dierent skill-levels.
5. If residuals dier systematically for traders and non-traders, that is, if there
is a regular pattern over quantiles and one that matches estimated dierences
in coecients and endowments, this is an indication for unobserved skill being
related to trade.
Mean comparison tests and tests of stochastic dominance are performed to show
whether wages, wage ratios and control variables are higher (or lower) for exporters,
importers or twoway traders over the whole distribution. An OLS-regression is used
to test for a relationship between exporting, importing, twoway trade and wages at
the rm level at the conditional mean. Quantile regression is used to explore this re-
lationship and the channels over which it may persist for wages at dierent quantiles.
A Blinder-Oaxaca style decomposition decomposes the estimated dierences in wage
levels and relative wages between traders and non-traders into into dierences aris-
ing from dierent endowments (the composition eect), from dierent coecients of
the exogenous variables (the structural eect) and the interaction between dierences
in endowments and dierences in coecients. A wage decomposition as proposed by
Juhn et al. (1993) decomposes the observed dierences in the dependent variable into
composition eects, eects of coecients and dierences arising from dierent distri-
butions of residuals at dierent quantiles. The two techniques can be used to test for
dierences in wage-setting functions according to the globalisation decision of rms.
The latter of the two allowing for dierences in residuals is particularly useful when
qualications cannot be suciently controlled for. To my knowledge, these two de-
composition methods have not been used to investigate the relationship of trade and
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wages before 10.
With OLS and quantile regression, the following linear equation is estimated:
wi = Xi +Mi + Ti + fi + si + ai ++sri + lpi + kli (1)
wi denotes wages. Separate equations are estimated with average wages, blue collar
wages, white collar wages and the white collar to blue collar wage ratio respectively
as the dependent. Xi is the export status of the rm, taking the value 1 if the rm
is a rm that exports only and zero otherwise. Mi = 1 denotes that the rm imports
part or all of its intermediate inputs but does not export and Ti = 1 if the rm both
imports and exports. fi = 1 if at least 10 % of the rm is in foreign ownership. si is
rm size measured by the total number of employees, ai is rm age, sri is the ratio of
white collar to blue collar employment, lpi is labour productivity and kli is the capital
to labour ratio.
4 Methodology
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests test for stochastic dominance of trading rms and of the
rms that import, export or do both respectively. An OLS regression analyses eects
of trade and trade volumes at the conditional mean for both production and nonpro-
duction workers. Quantile regressions are performed to give a more complete picture
of the relationship at dierent quantiles of the wage distributions. A decomposition
into a composition eect, a wage structure eect and a residual eect is used to test
for dierences in the wage setting function and in unobserved characteristics.
Results should be interpreted with caution as to the direction of the eect as, from the
outset, trade may inuence wages and wages may inuence trade via the same channels.
Given the very limited possibilities to control for worker and job characteristics in the
sample, this problem is exacerbated by the wage level itself being a sort of skill measure.
If explanatory variables are correlated with skill, i.e. if capital and skill are comple-
ments and productivity and skill are correlated, they are thus likely to be correlated
with the error term, which leads to biased coecients. Not too much weight should be
given to their absolute magnitude, but rather their relative values should be considered.
10Apart from Helpman et al. (2012), there are a couple of other papers in the eld that consider
residual wage inequality but use a dierent method. For example, Krishna, Poole, and Senses (2012)
nd that trade liberalisation increases residual wage inequality more for high-skilled labour by re-
gressing the standard deviation of estimated residuals from a wage regression on education and trade
variables.
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As there are many large outliers in the sample (about which there is little reason to
assume that they are outliers merely because of erroneous recording of data, so deleting
them would be wrong), OLS may yield inated coecients by giving too much weight
to these outliers. The errors may well not be i.i.d. as there are more outliers among
very large rms that pay rather high wages and thus not only could estimated coef-
cients be biased but also could estimated t-statistics be biased upwards and t-tests
wrongly reject the null-hypothesis of the coecients being zero. Comparing the median
instead of the mean gives much less weight to outliers and therefore quantile regression
can be a way to deal with this problem.
Another advantage is that quantile regression can give a much clearer picture of the
eects at work if they vary over the quantiles of the wage distribution. There are
only two occupational categories used in this work: production and non-production
employment. This is why quantile regression is even more useful here because higher
unconditional quantiles of the wage distribution are likely to be associated with worker
characteristics which are insuciently controlled for in the parametric specication.
4.1 Quantile Regression
Dierent from OLS minimising the sum of squared residuals, quantile regression (QR)
minimises absolute deviations of conditional quantiles:
Let  be a vector of unknown regression parameters from a sample of independent
observations on random variables Y1; Y2; :::; YT . They are then distributed according to
P (Yt < y) = F (yt   xt)
with xt; t = 1; :::; T the rows of a known T K design matrix. The exact shape of F
is not known. The th population quantile is
 = Prob[y  ]; 0 <  < 1
The th sample quantile may then be dened as any solution to the minimisation prob-
lem:
minb2R
hP
t2ft:ytbg jyt   bj+
P
t2ft:yt<bg(1  )jyt   bj
i
Then, the th regression quantile is dened as any solution to the minimisation prob-
lem:
minb2RK
hP
t2ft:ytxtbg jyt   xtbj+
P
t2ft:yt<xtbg(1  )jyt   xtbj
i
(Koenker and Bassett, 1978)
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The estimation of this equation is not straightforward though as the function is not
dierenciable in . Linear programming is therefore used to solve the minimisation
problem. A common method that is used here is the simplex method because it al-
ways yields a solution in a nite number of simplex iterations given that a solution
exists ((Cameron and Trivedi, 2005)). A linear minimisation problem like the estima-
tion of the regression quantile forms a polytope of the same dimension as the linear
model imposed on the parameters 1; :::; T when the corresponding variables are not
multicollinear. The polytope forms the feasible region of the maximisation problem
(or minimisation problem by multiplying the maximisation problem by (-1))11. With
an additional constraint, the simplicial cones formed by the vertices and their neigh-
bourhood become simplices. A simplex algorithm departs then from a starting ver-
tex, moving along the edges in each iteration. Convergence means then that there
is no step that could further decrease the sum of absolute weighted deviations (c.f
Dantzig and Thapa, 2003). There are several renements to this basic method and
dierent approaches to nding the starting base. Here, The simplex algorithm by
Armstrong, Frome, and Kung (1979) is used
For nding a basis, weighted least squares as in Schlossmacher (1973) is employed
12. This method is generalised to all quantiles by Hunter and Lange (2000).13.14
11A simplex is the simplest form of an n-dimensional polytope. A zero simplex is a point, a one
dimensional simplex is a line, a two-dimensional one a triangle and its interior, a three-dimensional one
a tetrahedron and its interior. That is, an n-simplex is the convex hull of n+1 vertices and is obtained
by connecting all angles that form an n-1 simplex with any ane independent point. The necessity of
the point being ane independent of the n-1 simplex means in the 2- respectively 3-dimensional case
that a tetrahedron cannot be formed by connecting all angles of a triangle with a point that lies on
the same plane, i.e. that is a linear combination of the angular points.
12This amounts to solving the least squares problem in k iterations:PN
i=1 wiR
2
i ; N = 1; :::; N
with R2i being the squared residuals and wi the weights. In the rst step, the weights are all set to
one. In the second step, the residuals are calculated with the generated LS residuals, Ri(k). In the
next step, the weighting factors are set to 1jRi(k)j . If any of these is close to zero, the individual weight
is set to zero. This is repeated until jRi(k + 1) Ri(k)j = 0.
13They approximate the minimization problem by a quadratic function that is increasing in residuals
and majorises (sorts in a decreasing order) the residuals at each quantile. Summing this function
over the residuals and minimising yields the next iteration of the weighted least squares algorithm
((Hunter and Lange, 2000, p.63f)).
14This procedure is incorporated for parameter estimation the command sqreg for simultaneous
bootstrap of several quantiles in Stata which is used here.
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4.2 Heteroscedacity
If the true model is y = x0+u with u  iid[0; 2], that is, if the errors are homoscedas-
tic,  does not vary over quantiles. Even more, if the assumptions of weakly exogenous
observations x is valid additionally, the OLS-estimator is BLUE 15 by the Gauss-Markov
Theorem and thus more precise than quantile regression. That is, quantile regression
is not particularly interesting but for its desirable properties for samples with many
outliers if there is not some form of heteroscedacity. As with OLS, heteroscedacity does
not cause QR coecients to be biased but leads to inconsistent estimation of standard
errors. Hence, t-tests may be more likely to wrongly reject the null hypothesis of no
eect of the exogenous variable in question on the dependent variable than otherwise.
Several authors suggest that this problem should not be exaggerated though (see for
example (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 275)). Others insist that it should not be ne-
glected, for example (Frolich and Melly, 2010, p. 26), who provide analytical standard
errors using the kernel method of Powell (1986) to estimate the asymptotic variance
as shown by Koenker (2005)16 17.
A more common method to estimate heteroscedacity robust standard errors in a variety
of settings is the bootstrap. The sample is treated as the population and multiple ran-
dom samples are drawn. The mean of the variances of the respective random samples
is the estimator for the variance of the complete sample. There are a number of varia-
tions of this method. Intuitively, the higher the number of replications, i.e. the number
of random draws, the better the approximation of the true variance. The bootstrap is
computationally expensive though. Andrews and Buchinsky (2000) propose a three-
step method to choose the number of bootstrap replications necessary for a probability
 that the parameter obtained with this number of replications B does not dier
by more than a certain percentage value from the parameter obtained with innitely
many replications 1. Note that this is not a direct statement about convergence
to the true parameter. However, Hahn (1995) shows weak convergence of the boot-
strap distribution to the limit distribution. The method by Andrews and Buchinsky
15Best linear unbiased estimator, that is, the unbiased linear estimator with the lowest variance
16Kernel methods are nonparametric methods to estimate the distribution of a random variable.
Similarly to but more sophisticated than the naive estimation by a histogram that counts how many
observation fall into a certain bin and uses the binwidth for smoothing, a kernel function determines
the shape of bumps that are placed at each observation, and a bandwidth (also called window width
or smoothing parameter) is chosen to determine the width of the bumps (compare Silverman, 1986)
17These standard errors are built in the version of their command ivqte for estimating exogenous
conditional quantile treatment eects, that is, the impact of one single dummy in the equation. For a
discussion of the appropriateness of the interpretation of a dummy as a treatment eect in the context
of quantile regression see e.g. (Koenker, 2005, chapter 2.1). This command can be used to obtain the
standard quantile regression estimates as well.
4.2 Heteroscedacity 24
(2000) suggests that for equation 1 run on the AIS data, 1075 replications are needed
for P

100 jB 1j
1  0:05

= 0:95 18. A Breusch-Pagan test on heteroscedacity for
equation 1 gives the following results for the listed dependent variables:
1. Logarithm of average wages: The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test does not
reject the Null of constant variance with a p-value of 0.2824. A test on the
specication wi = xi +mi + ti + fi
2. Logarithm of blue collar wages: The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test rejects
the Null with a p-value of 0.000.
3. Logarithm of white collar wages: The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test rejects
the Null with a p-value of 0.000.
4. White collar to blue collar wage ratios: The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test
rejects the Null with a p-value of 0.000.
The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test relies on the assumption of a normal distribu-
tion of the errors by restricting E[u4 j x4] to 34 (cf. Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, 275)
and has therefore little power when the errors are i.i.d. but not normally distributed.
The test suggests heteroscedacity, but the conclusion for average wages is not clear.
(Long and Ervin, 2000) use Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the performance
of several estimators of heteroscedacity consistent standard errors and tests on het-
eroscedacity and conclude that the decision on whether to use robust estimators should
not be based on these tests, but they should be used whenever heteroscedacity can be
suspected. Especially when skill and education are not controlled for, wages are likely
to vary more the higher they are, as more basic tasks are more homogenous than more
sophisticated ones. Correcting for heteroscedacity increases standard errors, there-
fore decreasing the probability of a type I error. Misapplication unduely increases the
probability of a type II error. This is less severe than assuming an eect when there is
none.
For these reasons, White robust standard errors are used for OLS and the Blinder-
Oaxaca-decomposition. The standard errors of the quantile regressions for the 10th,
the 25th, the 50th, the 75th and the 90th percentile as well as the decomposition at
these quantiles are all estimated with 1075 bootstrap replications. For comparison,
quantile regressions at the median for all specications using the implementation of
the kernel method of Powell (1986) by Frolich and Melly (2010) are given in the ap-
pendix. Note that these standard errors are increasing in sparcity, that is, they are
18The command bssize for Stata written by Poi (2004) is used for that.
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larger when the number of observations around the quantile of interest is lower, which
takes into account that the estimation of these parameters is less precise (Koenker,
2005, p.77).
4.3 Wald Tests
Wald tests can be used to test linear hypotheses such as the equality of coecients
wihin an equation. Usually considered a good nite sample approximation is the F-
statistic
F = (R^   r)0[R(N 1C^)R0] 1(R^   r)=h
with R being a matrix of constants, ^ a vector of parameters, r a vector of constants.
under H0 , R(N
 1C^) is of full rank h (the number of linear restrictions) under the as-
sumption of linearly independent restrictions. ^ is a consistent estimator of C0, which
is the asymptotic variance of the consistent estimator ^ ((cf. Cameron and Trivedi,
2005, 136)).
H0 is rejected if F > F(h;N   q)
For OLS, this is straightforward with ^ being ^ = (X0X) 1X0Y. In quantile re-
gression, an additional application of the test is testing for equality of coecients
over dierent quantiles. The test statistic for quantile regression is augmented to
TN = N (R^   r)0[RV 1R0] 1(R^   r), with ^ = ((1)0; :::; (m)0)0
and
V a mp mp matrix with the ij th block being
VN (i ; j ) = [i ^ j   ij ]HN (i) 1JN (i ; j )HN (j ) 1
to test for equality of coecients over quantiles, restrictions on individual parameters
and restrictions on several covariates, with
JN = N
 1Pn
i=1 xix
0
i
and
HN = limn!1N 1
Pn
i=1 xix
0
i fi(i()),
where
fi(i()) is the conditional density of the response yi evaluated at the th conditional
quantile. Whithout imposing the restriction that errors are iid, the limiting covariance
matrix of
p
N (^()  ()) takes the following form:p
N (^()  ()) N (0;  [1  )H 1N JNH 1N ) .
(cf. Koenker, 2005, p.74f)
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This variance can be estimated.
4.4 Tests of stochastic dominance and distribution
Consider two cumulative distribution functions F (y) and G(y). First order stochas-
tic dominance of F (y) over G(y) would mean that F (y)  G(y)8y ^ 9y such that
F (y) > G(y). A common approach to test for this is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
test. The two-sided test tests whether the distributions are equal and the one-sided
test wether one distribution stochastically dominates the other.
The hypotheses for the two-sided test are
H0 : F (y) G(y) = 08y
H1 : F (y) G(y) 6= 0 for some y
and for the one-sided test
H0 : F (y) G(y)  08y
H1 : F (y) G(y) > 0 for some y
The test statistic of the two-sided test is
KS1 =
p
nm
N
max1iN jFn(zi) Gm(zi)j
and of the one-sided test
KS2 =
p
nm
N
max1iNfFn(zi) Gm(zi)g
The asymptotic distribution of the test statistics is
limm;n!+1 P
np
mn
m+n
Dm;n  y
o
= 1  2P1i=1( 1)i 1e( 2i2z2)
with Dm;n = maxy(jD+jjD j) and D  = minyfF (y) G(y)g and D+ = maxyfF (y) 
G(y)g
This distribution has to be approximated, so that p-values are not exact. The test's
power is low at the tail of the distribution.
In addition to the KS-tests, quantiles of the distributions of log wages are plotted
against quantiles of the inverse normal distribution of the rank of sorted log wages to
see if they are roughly normal distributed. They would strictly follow a normal distri-
bution if the plotted line was linear. Outliers and granularity are a sign for deviations
of the normal. Quantiles of the distributions of traders and non-traders are plotted
separately, so are those of importers and non-importers, etc. If the wage distribu-
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tion for traders strictly dominates the one for non-traders, each quantile of the wage
distribution for traders should lie above the respective quantile for non-traders.19
4.5 Decomposition
Decomposition into endowments and coecients
First, a detailed Blinder-Oaxaca style decomposition with estimated eects of endow-
ments and coecients for all variables as well as the interaction of dierences in coef-
cients with dierences in endowments is performed at the mean20. If the assumption
of dierent residuals for trading and non-trading rms holds true, this type of decom-
position is likely to give biased results. Furthermore, as the OLS estimator is used,
they are likely to suer from the same shortcomings as the OLS linear regressions.
Nonetheless, this type of decomposition is interesting for comparison. Wages and wage
dierentials between group A and B are decomposed in the following way:
^0 = Y B   Y A = (^B0   ^A0) +
KX
k=1
XBk(^Bk   ^Ak)| {z }
Unexplained: ^S
+
KX
k=1
(XBk  XAk)^Ak| {z }
Explained: ^Y
+
KX
k=1
(XBk  XAk)(^Bk   ^Ak)| {z }
Interaction
 in this case contains all variables of equation 1. A great advantage of this approach is
that estimation is straightforward. The same specication is estimated on each sample
that is formed by the two groups. The counterfactual distribution is the distribution
that would prevail were workers of group A paid according to the same wage structure
as group B.21
Decomposition into endowments, coecients and residuals
To test the hypothesis of dierences in the wage setting function and dierences in
residuals, dierences in the wage distribution are decomposed into dierences in dier-
ences explained by characteristics, dierences explained by coecients and dierences
19The approach by Cox (2007) is followed here.
20This type of decomposition follows the seminal work by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973)
and is discussed extensively in the version with and without interaction in various textbooks, e.g.
Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011).
21For the estimation of this decomposition, the command by Jann (2011) is used.
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explained by residuals at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile using the de-
composition proposed by Juhn et al. (1993). For the estimation, the approach of Melly
(2005) with the amendments proposed in Chernozhukov, Fernndez-Val, and Melly (2012)
for inference on the counterfactual distribution 22.
The general approach of the Juhn et al. (1993) decomposition for wages is to decompose
the overall wage dierence between groups 23 into a composition eect (the dierence
in wages that would prevail had both groups the same wage setting function but the
prevailing distribution of covariates), a wage structure eect (the dierences in wages
that would be observed if both groups had the same characteristics but the prevailing
wage setting functions) and dierences in residuals.
^0 = Y B   Y A = (^B0   ^A0) +
KX
k=1
XBk(^Bk   ^Ak)| {z }
Unexplained: ^S
+
KX
k=1
(XBk  XAk)^Ak| {z }
Explained: ^Y
+
KX
k=1
(XBk  XAk)(^Bk   ^Ak)| {z }
Interaction
+
NX
t=1
(vB   vA)| {z }
Residuals
For this, one has to estimate the distribution of wages were rm i to be in group
trade=1 instead of trade=0. This distribution is not observed and is therefore called
the counterfactual.
The estimation of the standard Blinder-Oaxaca style decomposition for the mean is
quite straightforward because the unconditional expectation is simply E[Y ] = EX [E[Y j
X]] = E[X] by the law of iterated expectations 24 and the assumption of linearity and
zero conditional mean 25. The unconditional expectation is needed for the derivation of
the counterfactual distribution as  can then be interpreted as the eect of increasing
the mean of X on the unconditional mean of Y (see Fortin et al., 2011, p.8). This is not
so simple in quantile regression as the law of iterated expectations cannot be applied to
quantiles 26. Inference on counterfactional distributions is therefore more complicated.
Dierent solutions to this problem are proposed, all of which have their strengths and
22Built in the command cdeco jmp which is an implementation of several procedures based on
Chernozhukov et al. (2012) (see Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Melly (2008)). It uses the more-
mata package by Jann (2005).
23Traders and non-traders, importers and non-importers etc.
24Let X be an integrable random variable and Y be any random variable on the same probability
space, then E[Y ] = EX [E[Y j X]]
25 (see Fortin et al., 2011, p.54)
26The law of iterated expectations holds by taking the indenite integral over the conditional ex-
pectations. A quantile is not an integrable random variable though.
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drawbacks 27.
The decomposition method as proposed in Melly (2005) and Chernozhukov et al. (2012)
is suitable here because it does not assume rank-preservation 28 and it does not invoke
the zero conditional mean assumption29 or its weaker counterpart, ignorability30 as does
the original method by Juhn et al. (1993) which does not give a detailed approach of
how to condition the residuals on the covariates. It also does not assume homoscedacity
as do the reweighting approaches of DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) or Lemieux
(2002)31. Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) use a recentered inuence function32 to
estimate the counterfactual distribution. They suggest estimating the average marginal
eects by OLS or Logit or by a nonparametric estimator all of which are likely to suer
from the shortcomings already discussed given the characteristics of the AIS data and
the fact that the number of variables in the specication is not small.
The method by Melly (2005) is to estimate the whole conditional wage distribution
by quantile regression, then to obtain an estimate of the unconditional distribution by
integrating this conditional distribution over the covariates. The assumption of linear-
ity is criticised by (Fortin et al., 2011, p.63) as very strict. This linear specication can
be extended to contain logarithms and squared terms as well without loss of generality
though. It would still be problematic with spikes at certain points of the distribution
such as with a minimum wage as discussed in (Fortin et al., 2011, p.63), but although
minimum wages are paid in a few countries and sectors in the sample, the lower ends
of the wage distribution are not the focus of attention in the decomposition done here,
thus this problem should not be too severe.
27For an (incomplete) discussion on this see Fortin et al. (2011).
28Rank preservation would mean that a rm that trades would have the same rank in the coun-
terfactual distribution as it has in the observed distribution. This is a very strict assumption that is
likely not to hold.
29Independence of the residuals on X
30The residuals v may depend on X, as long as E[v j X] is the same for both groups to be compared.
31By estimating the counterfactual distribution with a probit or logit estimate of the probability of
being in one group conditional on the covariates when there are many variables, as is the case here.
Probit and logit estimates depend on homoscedacity for consistency.
32The inuence function of a distributional statistic is seen as an individual observation's inuence
on this distributional statistic. Firpo et al. (2009) add back this statistic to the inuence function and
obtain what they call the recentered inuence function..
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5 Data
The UNIDO Africa Investor Survey data has been collected using stratied random
sampling from 2009 to 2011 in 20 countries (Organization (2010)).33. It contains data
on 3600 companies whose main activity has been classied as manufacturing.34 2738 of
these companies gave information on all relevant variables and are kept in the sample
for estimation. They are classied into UN ISIC Rev.3.1 industry sector on the 2-digit
level according to their main product sold. 35.
5.1 Variables
Average wages, blue collar and white collar wages are in logarithms, so are rm size,
rm age, labour productivity and the capital-to-labour ratio.
Average wages of full-time employees by number of full-time employees
The total wage bill is divided by the total number of full-time employees asked in the
rst part of the questionnaire. These might include temporary full-time employees as
well. One would expect most temporary employees to be low-skilled. However, there
may have been misunderstandings as to whether full-time employees in general or full-
time permanent employees were asked36. These uncertainties make this variable less
informative in what concerns average wages conditional on employment category and
may lead to a downward bias for the coecient on the skill ratio. The total wage bill
including supplementary benets is asked which could be more relevant for medium and
high skilled workers. For temporary low skilled jobs monthly payments may be lower
than for permanent ones. Estimates for the wages of permanent full-time white and
blue collar employees might therefore be more exact than for average wages. The fact
that the estimates for average wages do not contradict those for permanent full-time
white and blue collar wages is a sign for the wage data being largely consistent.
33Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
34i.e.  50% of its activity.
35Firms were asked to list their three main products and the proportions they take up in their total
sales. Classication was done according to the highest percentage value.
36Considering numbers for casual/temporary and permanant full-time employees adding up to full-
time employees for some rms but not for others.
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Wages of permanent full-time employees
Average monthly wages for blue and white collar employees are divided by the respec-
tive numbers given in the second part of the questionnaire. Here rms are explicitly
asked for permanent, full-time employees.37
Trade dummies
The export dummy is 1 if a company exported any proportion of its output in the last
nancial year and did not import and zero otherwise. The import dummy is 1 if the
rm did not export in the last nancial year but imported a positive fraction of its
intermediate inputs directly, that is, not through a local importer. This is intended to
ensure that only rms are classied as importers that rely on direct interaction with
importers which is an important part of the hypothesised relationship. The Twoway
dummy is 1 when a rm both exported and imported directly from abroad in the last
nancial year and zero otherwise.
Foreign Dummy
The foreign dummy is 1 if a company has foreign ownership of more than 10% and
0 otherwise. Foreign rms could be more induced to prevent shirking with the help
of wages because they have a lesser developed network to exert social control. With
many foreign employees in the management and unfamiliar with the local environment,
they might be less able to control domestic employees because of cultural barriers and
misunderstandings as well as language dierences. This argument could also be valid for
low-skilled and semi-skilled labour. In some working environments, though the output
is observable, it might be not clear who is shirking or making mistakes. Depending
on how costly more control might be and how easily it can be exerted, higher wages
might be paid instead. As a lot of foreign companies are set up to oshore intermediary
productions steps and as such engage in exporting, this is a point to consider when
analysing trade and wages.38
37For reasons of simplicity and because it can be hard to make a clear distinction between ad-
ministrative/clerical employees and technical/managerial employees (Indeed, for some companies, the
number of technical/managerial employees is zero whereas some larger companies report no or very
few administrative/clerical but many technical/managerial employees.), the two categories have been
lumped together as white collar employees.
38Consider also the vast amount of literature on productivity and wage dierences between foreign
and domestic investors.
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Skill Ratio
For average wages, the white collar to blue collar employment ratio should have a
large positive eect on average wages as white collar employees are expected to earn
considerably more than blue collar employees. When white collar wages are considered
separately, it is not clear what to expect. On the one hand skill ratios may be related
to technology level, thus having a positive eect on wages, on the other hand, the more
white collar employees, the greater the likelihood that any white collar employee is
not one of the few most important technical/managerial employees, in this vein, the
smaller the average skill premium should be.
Firm Size
As both the total number of employees and sales gures are frequently used measures
for rm size in the trade and wages literature and employee numbers display fewer
outliers than sales gures and seem more reliable, the total number of employees is
used as a measure for rms size. This includes temporary employees as their number
contains signicant information on rm size.
Firm Age
Theory and evidence suggest that incumbents need to be less competitive than entrants
to compete with these because they already have incurred the xed costs of market
entry and possibly have already built up a reputation to ght an entrant even if they
are not actually able to do so. Younger rms might therefore be less able to oer high
wage premia, but whether they are more productive because they are to more intense
competition or less because they are smaller and less likely to exploit economies of scale
may depend on narrowly dened industry sectors. On average, the latter might prevail.
On the other hand, if younger rms are smaller, the proportion of highly qualied sta
may be higher too because at least a manager and some technical sta is needed even
if the rm is small. Whilst older rms can be expected to nd it easier to establish
trade relationships (not leastly because reputation may play a role particularly with
exporting), the link to wages is not very clear when wage categories are very broad and
indicators of skill-levels scarce.
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Labour productivity
Theories of rent-sharing suggest that wages depend positively on rm productivity,
therefore, a relationship with total factor productivity would seem reasonable. If it is
true that factors are paid their marginal product, however, the relationship with labour
productivity should be stronger.
Capital to labour ratio
Capital-skill complementarity would be a reason to assume that rms with a higher
capital-to-labour ratio are more skill intensive and thus pay higher average wages. Cap-
ital is measured by the total value of xed assets, which contains land improvements
and other constructions, machinery and other equipment, transport equipment, ICT
equipment and intellectual property.
Industry and country dummies
All OLS and quantile regressions are estimated with country and industry xed ef-
fects. Although industry-specic eects are rather undisputed in theory as well as in
empirical research and seem to show quite clearly in the AIS data especially when
the same equation is estimated once with a dummy for each combination of country
and industry and once with country dummies only, there are several hints that they
vary rather a lot across countries. For some country-industry pairs, there are very
few observations. As companies are only classied at the two-digit level, there can
be considerable variation as to the level of technology, risk premia, etc. For example,
a rm in ISIC33 may produce syringes, while another produces apparatus based on
the use of radiation. As another example, a rm in ISIC24 might produce soap while
another may producand another one pharmaceuticals. The dierence in human cap-
ital level and the requirements on commitment and exactness of production workers
can be substantial, being reected in wages according to theory. Therefore, with very
few observations at a given industry level for most countries, the likelihood that high
technology rms are very prevalent in one country whilst in the other country there
are low technology rms only is very high. Hence, some variation in wage levels due
to quite dierent requirements to qualications etc. related to product categories can
be expected to remain despite industry xed eects.
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A related variable of interest would be some technology proxy, and training of em-
ployees could also reveal higher skill intensity, but the sample does not oer any viable
option to account for this. 39.
The cross-sectional structure and lack of control variables for skill-level and technology
make analysis challenging. However, the data oer as-to-date unique insights into the
relationship of trade and wages over a large range of industry sectors. Some of the
countries covered have been surveyed for the rst time. Moreover, comparable data
on such a large number of countries makes it possible to draw some generalised con-
clusions. Thus, while awareness for possible pitfalls when interpreting the results is
important, the AIS 2010 data is well-suited to give valuable evidence on the research
questions laid out in this work.
5.2 Descriptive statistics and test results
Sample means of employment variables and other variables used in the estimation as
well as sales are reported in table 1 and 2. The KS-test results and mean comparison
test results are reported in tables 3 and 4. Except for relative blue and white collar
employment, the variables are in logarithms. All dependent variables and covariates
are tested on dierences in means and in distributions regarding trade status. Cate-
gories for trade status are Exporter, Importer, Twoway and Trade. Trade is a dummy
which is 1 if any of the latter dummies is 1 and zero otherwise. A problem with simple
hypotheses tests here is that the categories considered are not mutually exclusive.
Dierences in mean wages are considerable for all wage categories. The biggest dier-
ences can be seen for exporters and twoway traders. Comparison between means of
traders and the dierent control groups shows that mean wages are highest for twoway
traders. Means dier for all other variables and are higher for traders in all trade
39An often used measure of technology would be either the state value or the amount acquired of
ICT equipment and intellectual property (IPR) as a fraction of total xed assets or alternatively the
value of ICT and IPR relative to the number of employees. (Feenstra, 2010, p.26f) argues that the
fact that the fraction of high-tech equipment in new investment as technology measure explains 99 %
of the increased relative wage for nonproduction workers in Feenstra and Hanson (1999) is the reason
for the result that oshoring explains only 12% of the increase in nonproduction workers' relative
wage. He concludes that "these results are lopsided enough that we might be skeptical of using new
investment to measure high-tech equipment and therefore prefer the results using capital stocks".
However, ICT and IPR are often missing in the AIS sample and many rms give a lumpsum for the
two together with transport equipment. For these rms, it is clear that they do have some amount
of high technology, but there is no information how much. A dummy, however, would devide the
sample into "high" and "low" technology rms no matter how tiny the amount spent on ICT or IPR.
Regarding all entries with lump-sums and those with no entry as missing though reduces the sample
greatly and potentially leads to some form of sample selection.
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categories compared to their respective control group, that is, for exporters versus im-
porters and foreign versus domestic investors. The only exception is relative white
collar employment where mean values are highest for non-traders. Table 1 also shows
that variation is particularly high for employment.
Wage dierentials between non-production and production employee are considerable.
An average non-production employee at a trading rms earns 2.8 times more than a
production worker, compared to a bit less than 2.5 times more at a rm that does not
trade. At foreign companies, they earn on average 3 times more, compared to 2.5 times
at domestic companies.
With a few exceptions, the mean comparison and KS test results are in line with each
other. According to the KS-tests, the distributions of traders in all trade categories
(Any kind of trade, Importer, Exporter, Twoway trader) stochastically dominate those
of non-traders for average wages (including those of temporary and part-time work-
ers and supplementary benets), for blue collar and white collar wages (of permanent
full-time employees only), of total employment (including temporary and part-time
workers), and for employment of blue collar and white collar employees, all at mostly
high signicance levels. Firms that engage in any form of trade unanimously seem to
have higher employment and wage levels. The mean comparison tests yield no signi-
cant result when companies that import but do not export are considered. Results on
the ratio of blue collar employment are a bit surprising if the white collar to blue collar
ratio is considered to be a measure for skill-level which is suggested to be higher for
traders by theory. The Null of higher relative employment of blue collar workers in non-
trading rms is rejected for exporters, twoway traders and rms engaging in any kind
of trade. The Null of lower relative employment of blue collar workers in non-trading
rms cannot be rejected except for when importing is considered. The KS-tests on the
white collar to blue collar ratio (skill ratio) give the complementary result. However,
trading rms are signicantly bigger than non-traders when size is measured by the
total number of employees and they have higher employment in both white and blue
collar categories. The result on relative blue collar employment could thus be driven by
larger manufacturers needing more production workers relative to smaller manufactur-
ers everything else being equal. The result of non-importers stochastically dominating
importers is not in line with this. Possibly, the eect of exporting is so strong that the
result is driven by the comparison with exporters, not with non-traders. Some support
for this idea would be that importers stochastically dominate the comparison group
for the absolute numbers of blue and white collar employees. The mean comparison
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test results further suggest an ambiguous relationship and dierences in magnitudes
for importers and exporters. Tests on relative blue collar employment are insignicant
when any rm engaging in trade and importers are considered while they suggest that
exporters and twoway traders have higher relative blue collar employment than oth-
ers. When any rms engaging in trade are considered, the mean comparison tests on
relative white collar employment reject the Null of non-traders dominating traders. It
could be that dierences in the distributions of white and blue collar employment are
the reason for these somewhat conicting results.
One more point to consider is the connection with foreign investment. Foreign in-
vestors have a signicantly higher likelihood to be exporters as well, in fact, about 45
% of all rms with foreign ownership of at least 10% export, while only 20% of domestic
rms do (see table 2. Foreign investors are larger and have signicantly lower white
collar employment, while the mean comparison test on relative blue collar employment
yields no signicant result. The proportion of twoway traders relative to exporters is
the same for foreign and domestic rms though, which could be a sign for importing to
be complementary to exporting but not vice versa. That is, it could be that exporting
makes importing less costly but importing does not seem to make exporting easier.
One factor could also be that, in the case of a foreign parent company, the foreign in-
vestment is often set up to supply input goods, which requires less (possibly imported)
inputs than a plant producing nished goods. Furthermore, the investment is often set
up to process local resources. However, the connection with FDI should not be taken
as a complete explanation, as the estimation results in section 6 show.
The KS-tests for rm age indcicate that trading rms stochastically dominate non-
traders, except importers. A test on stochastic dominance for importers rejects with
a p-value of .085, though a test on the distributions being equal does not reject. For
labour productivity, the KS-tests unambiguously reject the Null of non-traders stochas-
tically dominating traders and of equal distribution and do not reject the Null of
stochastical dominance of traders in all trade categories. The KS-tests as well as the
mean comparison tests reject the Null of no stochastic dominance respectively for no
higher means of traders and the equality of distributions for any trade category when
the capital to labour ratio is considered. The results on log sales are a bit puzzling: the
mean comparison tests suggest higher means for traders at the 1%-level for all trade
categories except for insignicant results on importing. The KS-tests are curiously in
line with this by suggesting stochastic dominance of traders on all signicance levels
whilst rejecting the Null of no dierence in distributions, of stochastic dominance of
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importers and of non-importers on the 1%-level. The quantiles of both distributions
plotted against the quantiles of the normal distribution (see Appendix, gure 2) reveal
that sales gures at lower quantiles are lower for non-importers but the increase over
quantiles is steeper, such that at all quantiles higher than the median, the distribution
of non-importers lies higher. Possibly this has to do with FDI. Quantile quantile plots
for domestic and foreign companies show that all sales gures of foreign companies at
all quantiles lie visibly above those of domestic companies, with a some outliers at the
upper quantiles, a few of them very large (see Appendix, gure 5). This ambiguity
is another argument against using sales as a control variable for size, especially as it
shows no major benets compared to the total number of employees.
Quantile-quantile plots for log average wages show that wages are higher for traders
over the whole distribution except for the tails when rms that engage in trade are
considered simultaneously, for exporters and for twoway traders (see gure 1).40 The
dierence is generally not large. The high dierentials at the lower tails in the plot for
any kind of trade are driven by the distributions for importers. Interestingly, except
for the lower tails, there is not such a big dierence in wages for importers and non-
importers. At higher quantiles, non-importers pay higher wages than importers. A
reason for this could be that at these quantiles, the dierentials between all exporters
and others are higher. For production wages (see gure 2), the distributions of im-
porters and others seem to be the same, except for a few high values for importers
at the higher quantiles. For the other trade categories, the dierence is higher. For
white collar wages, dierences seem to be higher than for blue collar wages, but disper-
sion is higher, too, especially for twoway traders. Again, dierentials are lower when
importers are compared to others, with non-importers lying above importers at high
quantiles. Generally, the mostly linear pattern for all combinations of trade and wage
categories suggest that the assumption of normal distribution of log wages is accept-
able. Nonetheless, the tails suggest some deviations, especially for blue collar wages,
which can be seen in average wages, too.
White to blue collar wage ratios show considerable deviations from the normal dis-
tribution. This is not surprising but an obstacle for tting a model. Wage ratios are
higher for traders than for non-traders at all quantiles, suggesting higher skill premia.
The highest observation is a company that does not trade though, whilst a KS-test sug-
gests stochastic dominance of traders, showing the low power of KS-tests at the tails.
40Because of large numbers of observations and a small scale and because distributions of separate
subsamples are plotted against the inverse normal of the total sample, some observations appear at
lower quantiles but actually have higher values for wages than some observations at higher quantiles.
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For twoway traders, wage ratios are considerably higher than for the control group at
some quantiles above the median, whilst non-twoway traders have higher wages at the
highest quantiles. The same is true for rms that export, but do not import, but the
pattern is a little less pronounced.
All in all, these results show that it is important to distinguish between exporters,
importers and twoway traders. A relationship with wages and wage ratios and vari-
ables over which this relationship might be established is particularly strong for twoway
traders, and, to a lesser extent, for exporters. Results on imports are mixed, but it
is suggested that importing is indeed related to higher wages, too, and again to dif-
ferences in labour productivity, capital intensity and size. One major factor is that
foreign companies have a higher propensity to export and have the highest values in
wage and control variables. They are less likely to import and importers are smaller in
sales and total employment, though bigger than rms that do not trade at all. Tests
on stochastic dominance of exporters versus importers conrm this (see table 3). The
results stress the importance to control for foreign ownership and to consider the whole
wage distribution rather than the mean only.
6 Estimation Results
In the rst specication, eects of importing, exporting and twoway trade on the depen-
dent variables are estimated while controlling for foreign ownership. Control variables
are subsequently added to test for channels over which the established relationship
takes place with specication 6 containing all controls. The dependent variables are
average wages (including supplementary benets and wages of temporary employees),
blue collar wages, white collar wages and the white to blue collar wage ratio.
As mentioned in section 4, causality is hard to establish and misspecication with
respect to skill-intensity is an obstacle in interpretation. As rm-level eects are in
the focus of interest, all equations are estimated with sector and country xed eects,
bearing in mind that the high level of aggregation still leaves room for price eects at
the sector level to inuence estimated results. Wage levels and control variables are in
logarithms, except for dummy variables.
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6.1 OLS results
OLS estimation results for average, blue collar and white collar wages as well as wage
ratios are shown in table 541.
Average Wages
Across all specications for average wages, the estimated marginal eect of a company
being a twoway trader is smaller than that for being an exporter or importer. This is
surprising given that mean values for all wage categories are the highest for this trade
group - on the other hand, foreign ownership, industry and country is controlled for.
Still, even if the complementarity eects suggested by theory were not true, it is not
evident why a rm that exports and imports should pay wage premia about a third
below those of a rm that only exports. A reason could be that the specication is
insucient and the cross section exhibits considerable variation. The standard devi-
ation is indeed higher for twoway traders than for either importers or exporters. An
F-test on equality of coecients does not reject the Null of no dierence. The trade
coecients remain signicant at the same levels and hardly change in magnitude when
total employment and then rm age are added as control variables. In specication
4, the skill ratio is added. Its coecient is positive and signicant, though very low.
This is a sign for the skill ratio being a very crude measure for skills as long as total
employment is controlled for. Signicance levels of the trade dummies remain the same
and coecients for Exporter and Importer change by less than 10 % of their initial
value. When labour productivity is added though, coecients reduce considerably and
become insignicant. The introduction of capital intensity further reduces the coe-
cients, but by a very small proportion. The R2 is not very high, but this is not unusual
for cross-section data. The AIC selects the last specication as the best, the BIC the
more parsimonious specication 5.
These results suggest that rms that trade pay higher than average wages. The es-
timated dierence is considerable, around 15 % for exporters and importers and 10%
for twoway traders. It is interesting that once the eect of a company being foreign,
average wage premia are the same for importers and exporters. Because importers
and exporters dier greatly in size and exporters have been found to have signicantly
higher endowments as far as performance variables are conrmed, these results suggest
that at least the estimated dierence for importers is not exclusively due to selection
41All tables with estimation results have been exported from Stata using the commands eststo and
esttab by Jann (2007).
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eects.
Blue collar wages
All coecients of interest are signicant in the rst specication - the export and
import coecient at the 5 %-level contrary to the 1%-level as for average wages. The
estimated coecient on Twoway is larger and signicant at a higher level though. This
dierence might simply be due to the higher variation in wages for twoway traders.
The Exporter coecient becomes insignicant upon introduction of size, whilst the
coecient on Importer changes only by a fth and does not further change when age and
relative white collar employment are added, as is the case forsimilarly to the coecient
on Twoway. When labour productivity is added, they both become insignicant and
change only slightly when capital intensity is controlled for. This points towards a
more important and more stable inuence of importing on production wages compared
to exporting, though F-tests on the equality of coecients all fail to reject the Null.
Both AIC and BIC select the 5th specication.
White collar wages
Twoway is only signicant in the rst specication. The coecient on Exporter reduces
by about 40% when total employment is added, the coecient on Importer by a bit less
than a third. They remain stable when age and the skill ratio are added. When labour
productivity is added, the coecient on Exporter reduces by a half and the coecient
on Importer by more than a third. Importer remains signicant at the 5%-level though,
and hardly changes when capital intensity is added. Again, AIC and BIC select the
5th specication.
White collar to blue collar wage ratio
The model t suggested by the R2 is very bad, which is not surprising given that the
assumption of a normal distribution is clearly not true. This might be a reason for
AIC choosing the last specication while BIC chooses specication 2. The magnitude
of the coecients suggests that there is a relationship with rms' trade decisions - the
estimated marginal eect of the export decision is roughly 36% which is more than
twice that for average wages and the estimated marginal eect of the import decision
is roughly 17% which is similar for average wages. Due to the bad model t, pat-
terns in the residuals are likely to play a role in the very high estimated variation in
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coecients which leads to the t-tests rejecting the hypothesis of dierence from zero.
Sample standard deviation of the wage ratio is already very large though (see table 1)
and the main coecients of interest do not become signicant when size is controlled
for. This could well have to do with the insuciency of the model when it comes to
skill-intensity, which can be expected to have a much higher inuence on wage ratios
than on levels. Therefore, a regression at the mean does not reveal much and merely
gives some weak evidence of there being a relationship of wage ratios with the trade
decision of rms.
For wage levels, signs of control variables are as expected by theory, with the ex-
ception of the skill-ratio being ambiguous, pointing towards measurement problems for
skill-levels. Firm age and size have signicant and positive eects on the wage level.
While size has a positive and signicant impact on relative wages as well, in line with
the idea that larger rms exploit economies of scale and can aord to attract more
qualied employees, the eect of age is not signicant for wage ratios. This may reect
ambiguity on how market entrants compete with incumbents.
It is interesting to note that labour productivity is estimated to have a particularly
high inuence on wage ratios as compared to wage levels. Theories of rent-sharing
are conrmed by productivity having a positive and signicant inuence on blue collar
wages as well. In line with the notion of eciency wages, these productivity premia
are higher for white collar wages though.
6.2 QR results
Figures 6 - 13 display QR estimates and condence intervals at every fth percentile of
the wage distributions of all wage categories for the coecients on Importer, Exporter
and Twoway and specications 1 and 5. 42 After a brief discussion focussing on the
change in coecients over distributions and on what this means for model t, QR
estimations of all specications 1 - 6 at quantiles .1, .25, .5, .75 and .9 are discussed in
detail.
The tted coecient graphs are not very smooth and condence intervals rather large
43. This could be due to noise and omitted variable bias. Condence intervals become
particularly large towards higher quantiles. The shape of the curves for specication
42The command grqreg written by Azevedo (2011) was used for this.
43Note that the condence intervals shown here are based on the standard errors calculated relying
on the assumption of homoscedasticity. These tend to underestimate the true variance, so the actual
condence intervals can be expected to be even larger.
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1 and increasing condence intervals at quantiles with many observations suggest that
coecients are not linear over quantiles and quantile regression can indeed reveal more
than OLS.
For average wages, the coecient of Exporter is highest at lower quantiles, decreases
slightly and increases very little from the median onwards where condence intervals
become very large. For blue collar wages, the Exporter coecient increases very lit-
tle over quantiles and condence intervals become very large roughly at the seventh
quantile. For white collar wages, the tted curve is roughly U-shaped with the bottom
at the median. Although condence intervals become very large from there onwards,
they include zero only at the 9th quantile. The Importer coecient for average wages
decreases up to the second quantile and increases up to the sixth quantile after which
the pattern is not clear. For blue collar wages, the Importer coecient displays a rather
sharp increase between the sixth and eighth quantile. Although condence intervals
become larger, they include zero only at the ninth quantile. The Importer coecient
for white collar wages shows a comparibly steady increase and is well above zero at
all quantiles, though estimated condence intervals become very large from the sixth
quantile onwards. In line with patterns observed for the OLS regression, the estimated
coecient for Twoway is the least stable. For average wages, it is above zero from
the second quantile onwards and increases slightly towards the median. Condence
intervals are large and include zero at several quantiles. For blue collar wages, it moves
around 10 % over all quantiles. Condence intervals are very irregular. For white collar
wages, the Twoway coecient is above zero only from the third quantile onwards while
condence intervals are strictly above zero between the fourth and seventh quantile
only. Whithin this array, there is a rather steep increase and a slight decline from the
median onwards.
The patterns of estimated coecients for white and blue collar wages do not con-
ict with those for average wages but give a much more detailed picture. For white
collar wages, Importer and Exporter coecients are well above zero for specication
1. The same is true for the Twoway coecients well around the median. For speci-
cation 5, all trade coecients are mostly close to zero and condence intervals mostly
include zero. Although this suggests that most of the estimated eect is explained by
the controls, the clearly visible patterns suggest some omitted regularity. The reason
could be the assumed functional form of the log-normal distribution does not t well
or that important variables are omitted.
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For blue collar wages, the pattern is much more regular. At most quantiles, Exporter
and Importer coecients are above zero, but condence intervals include zero at most
quantiles except for around the median. Towards the highest quantiles, the estimated
eect increases. Specication 5 shows very regular patterns of coecients around zero
and there is no signicant increase towards higher quantiles anymore. There is no
signicant eect of twoway trade.
Estimated coecients for the white to blue collar wage ratio suggest why coecients
at the mean have such high standard deviations. Coecients steadily increase over
quantiles up to roughly .30 for Importer and about .50 for Twoway at the ninth quan-
tile. The condence interval for Exporter includes zero at the eighth quantile and the
highest estimated coecient is about .30 at the seventh quantile. For specication 5,
all these patterns disappear and coecients are zero except for higher quantiles where
condence intervals are very large.
These observations conrm the OLS-results and suggest nonlinearity in the main coef-
cients of interest. This nonlinearity is more obvious for white collar wages and wage
ratios. Although the estimates for wage ratios suggest bad model t, their pattern
combined with the observation of eects increasing more sharply over quantiles for
white collar wages (though the pattern for Exporter is less clear) gives support for the
notion of increasing wage premia over quantiles. Again, the patterns for blue and white
collar wages suggest that omitted variables are considerably more important for white
collar wages. This could be a hint on skill-biasedness of trade which will be further
explored in the following sections.
Estimates given in tables 6 - 9 at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile
are a bit arbitrary given the irregularity displayed in gures 6 - 13. But, after all,
this irregularity might tell us more about the bad model t than about changes in the
true magnitude of the coecients. It has to be taken into account that the variance is
increasing in the tails of the distributions.
Average wages
The Exporter dummy is signicant at the tenth quantile only in specication 1. When
size is controlled for, the estimated marginal eect reduces slightly from around 24%
to .22%. Firm age seems to have no eect on the Exporter coecient, as well as the
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skill ratio. When labour productivity is added, the estimated coecient becomes in-
signicant. Otherwise, the coecient on Exporter is only signicant at the median
when size and age are controlled for. This could be a coincidence. The estimated eect
of Importer is signicant at all quantiles except the ninth in specications 1, 2, 3 and
4. When labour productivity is added, it is still signicant at the median with an
estimated marginal eect of 6% relative to a median rm that does not trade. Figure
7 hints that this result is not just a coincidence of choosing the specic quantile, but
that there is a signicant inuence around the median as well. The estimates suggest
that the relationship is strongest at the median for Importer and Twoway. It seems
that very little of the estimated eects is due to rm size and age. The introduction
of the skill ratio (on which the coecient is positive and signicant on the 1% -level
but very small) considerably decreases Importer coecients at the 50th and 75th per-
centile, while causing an increase respectively a decrease of the Twoway coecients,
which is surprising and could be due to the small sample of twoway traders combined
with considerable variation over quantiles. As expected, the estimated marginal eect
of labour productivity is large and highly signicant, though magnitutes are a little
unstable over quantiles.
Blue collar wages
The Exporter coecient is signicant at the median and the 75th percentile in speci-
cation 1 and only robust to the inclusion of rm size and age at the 75th percentile.
When the skill ratio is controlled for, no signicant eect can be found. A remarkably
stable eect of Twoway is found at the median. Even when labour productivity and
capital intensity are controlled for, there is a signicant coecient of .083. Considering
that the coecient is higher than in the previous three specications and the coef-
cients on all added variables are positive, this estimate should be taken with much
caution.
White collar wages
As expected, the estimated eect of a rm being an exporter or importer is most stable
over specications and highest in magnitude when white collar wages alone are con-
sidered. There seems to be some nonlinearity in control variables as well, since the
estimated eect is not strongest at the same quantiles over specications for exporters.
Outliers could be a reason for this at the 10th and 90th percentile, but at other per-
centiles, this is not a viable explanation. When only foreign ownership is controlled
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for, the strongest eect is suggested at the lower quantiles and, to a lesser extent, at
the higher quantiles for Exporter, while the strongest eect of Importer is estimated at
the 90th quantile respectively at the median. The Exporter dummy remains signicant
with the inclusion of size, age and the skill ratio at quantiles .1 to .5 only. The im-
porter dummy remains signicant at the 10%-level when labour productivity is added,
but not with capital intensity. Even though the Twoway dummy is signicant only at
quantiles .5 and .9 in the rst specication, specications 2-4 suggest a rather strong
eect at the median and the 75th percentile, while the coecient at the 75th percentile
remains signicant when labour productivity and capital intensity are included.
Wald tests on the equality of coecients on the dierent trade dummies suggest in-
equality only for white collar wages as the dependent variable, and there only at the
10th and the 25th quantile for specications 1-4, and at the median for specication 4.
Wald tests on the equality of coecients over quantiles do not reject the null hypothesis
except for Twoway with white collar wages as the dependent and specications 1, 4, 5,
6. This might even be a coincidence as it is quite likely that some tests wrongly reject
if so many of them are performed. Model t suggested by R2 is not impressive but not
at all unsusual for cross-section data.
Wage ratios
Although estimation at dierent quantiles are a little less problematic than estima-
tion at the mean only in the case of a clearly nonlinear conditional distribution of the
dependent variable, model t is not greatly improved compared to OLS. Some relation-
ship is suggested by various signicant coecients, but the pattern is pretty arbitrary
except for the rst specication, for which Exporter is signicant at all but the 90th
percentile. Large standard deviations causing t-statistics to be very small are not sur-
prising given that a straight line is tted for a distribution that is all but linear. This
justies considering large insignicant coecients as weak evidence of a relationship as
well. There are very few observations at the 90th percentile though. This is a reason
for not giving too much weight to the results at the 90th percentile.
Estimated coecients suggest that the export decision has a positive eect at the
median and the 75th percentile that goes mainly over labour productivity. The same
goes for Exporter at all quantiles with about half the estimated eect in specication
1 due to size. At the median, there is still an estimated marginal eect of almost 20%
when labour productivity and capital intensity are controlled for. For twoway trade,
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a negative marginal eect of about 17% is estimated at the median in specications
3-6 which is higher in absolute value than in the previous specications. Although a
pattern according to which Twoway behaves is hard to establish for absolute wages as
well, this is a little confusing.
These results conrm a positive relationship between the globalization decision of a
rm and its wage levels. The greatest part of this eect is through labour productiv-
ity. A distinction between selection of more productive rms into trade and eects of
trade on productivity is not possible though. Part of the estimated eect goes through
size as well, mainly for exporters. The fraction of the Exporter coecient that can
be attributed to size is rather a sign for self-selection than for a channel over which
trade could have an eect on wages. Firm age cannot be excluded to be a factor for
self-selection of rms that pay higher wages into trade, but there is no evidence for it
to play any signicant role as a channel over which trade and wages are related. Still,
rm age is conrmed in itself important as a determinant of wages as laid out in the
OLS results section.
Signs and magnitudes of coecients of the ratio of white collar to blue collar em-
ployment suggest that it is a very imperfect measure for skill for blue collar wages, but
for white collar wages, this eect seems to be outweighted by a high skill ratio meaning
many white collar employees and so lower average wages because a great part of them
performs medium skilled tasks. The ratio seems to be very stable over dierent values
for total employment as the very low standard deviation suggests.
Although F-tests on the equality of the coecients over quantiles do not suggest this,
it seems that coecients do vary systematically over quantiles for absolute wages. Sur-
prisingly, the peak of the inuence of exporting seems to be at lower quantiles for
white collar wages while being at higher quantiles for blue collar wages. This speaks
against skill-biasedness of exporting for white collar wages. For blue collar wages, this
observation merely suggests that rent-sharing plays a minor role at lower quantiles,
a view which is supported by coecients on covariates, notably labour productivity,
increasing over quantiles for blue collar wages but not much so for white collar wages.
The results on wage ratios suggest a rather high eect of exporting but there is no
reliable evidence for this, whilst estimated coecients on Twoway further raise doubt
about how seriously the estimates can be taken.
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F-tests give little evidence for unequal eects of imports, exports and twoway trade
but again, estimates suggest that they do dier and that their relationship with other
covariates, notably size and labour productivity diers: The estimated eect of im-
porting is increasing over quantiles for white collar wages, for blue collar wages and for
wage ratios. The fact that this inuence can safely be excluded to be due to size and
foreign ownership points towards skill-biasedness for importing.
Part of the variation in trade coecients over quantiles may be due to variation of
the eect of labour productivity. For blue collar wates, the eect is highest at the
lower and higher quantiles. The same is true for white collar wages and the wage ra-
tios. The estimated elasticity of blue collar wages with respect to labour productivity
ranges between .047 and 0.084, but this eect is reduced by a trie when capital inten-
sity is introduced, reecting productivity eects of capital intensity. For white collar
wages, elasticities range from .088 to .114. For wage ratios, they are particularly large
at the higher quantiles, that is, .154 at the 90th percentile.
The general ndings at the mean apply to the whole distribution. However, quan-
tile regression estimates show that the eect of trade is indeed not the same over
quantiles. Particularly, eects that cannot be controlled for seem to matter for relative
wages and white collar wages.
Estimations at the median based on analytical standard errors (see table 13 in the
Appendix) show that these standard errors do not dier much from the bootstrap es-
timates, giving some support to the notion that the number of replications has been
appropriately chosen and that signicance levels are therefore valid.
6.3 Decomposition
The decompositions are performed on specication 5 whithout country and industry
dummies. This may lead to some bias in the estimated dierences in dependent vari-
ables as trading rms occur in higher frequency in industry sectors and countries that
are more open to trade which is generally found to have an eect on wages. However,
the assumption that industry and country xed eects are the same for trading and
non-trading rms is not very strict when the focus of interest is not the magnitude of
wage dierencials but their source.
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Decomposition at the mean
Results are shown in table 10. The decompositions are performed for specication 6
by comparing companies that engage in any form of trade with those that do not trade
at all. Decomposing by trade categories would either mean that the comparison group
would contain other rms that trade as well which would make interpretation dubious
or selectively reduce the sample. Hence, trade is chosen to draw some general, but
more tractable conclusions.
For average wages, about 85%- of the estimated total absolute dierence in mean wages
between trading and non-trading rms is explained by dierences in endowments. For
white collar wages, dierences in endowments are estimated to explain about three
quarters of the total dierence, almost 90% for blue collar wages and about 80% for
wage ratios. Estimated total dierences in coecients and the interaction between
these and dierences in endowments are tiny and insignicant for average wages and
blue collar wages. For wage ratios, dierences in coecients are estimated to be re-
sponsible for 47% of the gap between traders and non-traders, but the estimate is
insignicant and the sum of estimated eects is greater than the total dierence. For
white collar wages, dierences in coecients are estimated to explain 20% of the total
dierence in coecients. The detailed decompositions shows signicant estimates for
an eect of coecients for Foreign (white collar and blue collar wages), rm age (blue
collar wages), and the skill ratio, labour productivity and the capital to labour ratio
(wage ratios), for which there are signicant interaction eects of these three variables
as well. The insignicant estimated eects of coecients give are in line with expec-
tations as far as signs are concerned for blue and white collar wages as well as wage
ratios. Capital intensity is an exception, for which coecients and endowmets are es-
timated to be considerably higher for non-traders when wage ratios and white collar
wages are considered. this is not the case for blue collar wages. Additionally, labour
productivity is estimated to pay o more for traders when blue and white collar wages
as well as wage ratios are considered, with the estimated dierence being particularly
high, which is not in line with estimates for average wages. The skill ratio is found
to have a much higher coecient for non-traders, while the ambiguity involved with
its interpretation remains. Labour productivity increases wage ratios more in trading
rms and so does capital intensity. Eects of dierences in endowments are mainly
driven by labour productivity across categories, with capital-intensity being a major
factor for wage ratios also. For blue collar wages, the estimated dierence in the con-
stant is positive which means that average wages given controls are lower for traders.
As the equation is misspecied and estimated on noisy cross-section data, this is hard
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to interpret.
The results for the detailed decomposition estimated with OLS point towards dif-
ferences in the wage setting function between traders and non-traders. To what extent
this plays a role for the typical channels over which trade may inuence wages is not
totally clear due to somewhat contradictory results. It seems that this kind of de-
composition is simply insucient because of variation of coecients over quantiles and
omitted variables.
Decomposition at dierent quantiles
Results are displayed in table 11. The decomposition is performed at the 10th, the
25th, the 50th, the 75th and the 90th percentile. Results are much less ambiguous than
for the Blinder-Oaxaca-style decomposition. This could be because if the interpretation
of regression results that coecients vary over quantiles is true, a decomposition at the
mean is inuenced by violations of the normality assumption for residuals. Addition-
ally, the vulnerability of OLS with respect to outliers applies here as well. There is at
best very weak evidence for dierent residuals by trade involvement for absolute wages.
Residuals for wage ratios seem to dier though. Dierences in endowments explain the
greatest part of total dierences for all wage categories and over all quantiles. The lat-
ter are highest at the median for absolute wages (and roughly the same at the median
and the 75th quantile for blue collar wages) and steeply increasing over quantiles for
wage ratios. Dierences in coecients are signicant for average wages at all quantiles
except .10. Residuals are estimated to decrease the gap and dierences in coecients
to increase it half as much as dierences in endowments at the 75th percentile. It is
not very clear why this should be so. There would have to be some omitted variable
that increases wages much more for non-traders than for trades. There is no straight
answer which variable this should be. As there is no such result for white collar and
blue collar wages, it could be that average wages containing both blue collar and white
collar wages is the reason. Support for this idea is lent by the same contradictory
results for the decomposition at the mean. Dierences in endowments are found to
make up roughly 95% and coecients around 5% of the total dierence in blue collar
wages at the 75th percentile. For white collar wages, the relative eect of coecients
is decreasing from 49% at the 10th percentile to 35% at the 75th respectively 43% at
the 90th percentile.
For average wages, the eect of endowments seems to make up the greatest part of
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the dierence. For blue collar wages, there is no evidence for the wages setting func-
tion to dier between traders and non-traders. For white collar wages, there is strong
support for dierences in the wage setting function. Its relative importance is higher
at lower quantiles which could be a hint for skill-biasedness of trade and skill being
complementary to factors related to trade as presumed in hypothesis 4.
For relative wages, dierences in endowments are responsible for almost the total dier-
ence between distributions at the 10th percentile. This is the case at the 25th percentile
as well, but eects of residuals and eects of coecients cancel each other out. At the
median, the eect of coecients is estimated to cause 58% of the total dierence and
the eect of endowments almost all the rest. At the 75th quantile, coecients are
found to be responsible for 26% of the dierence, at the 90th quantile for 20%. At
these two quantiles the residuals are estimated to cause a large increase in the dier-
ence, contrary to ndings at the 25th percentile. These patterns are explained too well
by the shape of the wage ratio distribution to be interpreted literally. Nonetheless, the
observed pattern combined with the eects estimated for white collar wages would be
in line with hypothesis 4 as well.
The hypothesis of correct specication of the model cannot be rejected for any wage
category (see table 12). Tests of stochastic dominance for the eect of characteristics
suggest that the distributions of traders dominate those of non-traders for all wage
variables and that eects are not constant over quantiles for wage ratios and possibly
for white collar wages. This is evidence for selection of rms with comparably high
wage levels and skill premia into trade or for trade to increase wages by having a
positive inuence on characteristics that are positively related to wage levels and skill
premia. It is possible that both are the case. To what proportion is not clear how-
ever. Tests of stochastic dominance yield mixed evidence for traders to stochastically
dominate non-traders for average wages and blue collar wages. For white collar wages
and wage ratios, there is evidence for the distributions of coecients for traders to
dominate those of non-traders. The hypothesis of a constant eect of coecients over
quantiles is rejected by both the KS-test and the CMS-test for wage ratios, but not
for white collar wages. Evidence for eects of the residuals is found for average wages
and wage ratios. The hypothesis of a constant eect is rejected. For average wages,
residuals are found to increase wages for non-traders relative to those for traders but
the above reasoning applies. The KS-test but not the CMS-test reject the hypothesis of
no stochastic dominance of traders when residual eects are concerned. The hypothesis
of a constant eect is rejected for both categories.
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The eect of residuals is not clear though there is evidence for them playing some
ambiguous role. This lends some support to hypothesis 5. The decomposition results
give strong support to hypothesis 3, conrming the linear regression results. There is
strong evidence for dierent wage-setting between traders and non-traders as well as
far as white collar wages and wage ratios are concerned. Whereas factors having a
positive inuence on wages are found to pay o more for traders, it is not clear which
these factors are.
6.4 General results
OLS and QR estimation provide evidence for the rst hypothesis of a positive relation-
ship between trade and wages both for production and non-production wages. Indeed,
a great part of the estimated eect is due to higher productivity levels. Size is an
important factor for wages of exporters, which can be attributed to larger rms being
more likely to select into exporting and to pay higher wages in general. For importers,
size is not an essential part of the relationship. There is very weak evidence for capital
intensity to be a factor for blue collar wages but not for white collar wages. Most of
the estimated eect for all trade categories is due to productivity.
There is weak evidence for complementarity of importing and exporting when white
and blue collar wages are considered separately, but only at the median. Estimates at
other quantiles and at the mean give the impression that the number of twoway traders
is too small, the variance too high and the relationship between trade and wages at
the rm level too indirect and, last but not least, the proportion of twoway traders
that are foreign investors too large to draw any reliable conclusion on complementarity.
There is evidence for the second hypothesis that the eect of rm-level exporting
is stronger at higher quantiles of blue collar wage distributions. This is not true for
the distribution of white collar wages: Estimated marginal eects are highest at lower
quantiles and lowest around the median. It is possible that for white collar wages, other
factors are more important at higher quantiles, such as technology level and innovation.
Given that plots of estimates on every fth percentile reveal a very shaky pattern, it
is not even clear that there is any dierence over quantiles at all for exporters. For
importers though, the hypothesised relationship is found to be true: Estimated eects
of importing is increasing over quantiles for white and blue collar wages as well as wage
ratios whith the estimated coecients being particularly strong for white collar wages,
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and at the highest quantiles for wage ratios. It could be that selection is a better
explanation for the estimated eects when it comes to exporters, while it seems that
there is some eect at least from importing to wages for importers.
There is evidence for the third hypothesis that wage ratios depend positively on trade,
that is, estimated marginal eects are generally higher for white collar wages than for
blue collar wages. OLS and QR regressions for non-production to production wage ra-
tios give positive estimates for the importer and exporter dummy at several quantiles
with the estimated eect being signicant at several quantiles for the exporter dummy
when only foreign ownership is controlled for but high variation and bad model t are
a reason to take this result with much caution. Furthermore, the pattern of coecients
over quantiles and specications suggests the model lacks explanatory power. Nonethe-
less, there is rather strong evidence for the third hypothesis when these ndings are
combined with those for white collar wages.
A Blinder-Oaxaca-style decomposition into eects of characteristics, endowments and
the interaction between the two attributes much less importance to dierences in co-
ecients than a Juhn, Murphy and Pierce-style decomposition into eects of charac-
teristics, coecients and residuals. Quantile plots and regression results suggest that
assumptions needed for OLS being unbiased and ecient are violated. This points to-
wards the decomposition with quantile regression giving the more reliable results, even
more so as general conclusions from the two methods do not contradict each other.
Even though dierences in residuals are only signicant at a few quantiles for average
wages, white collar wages and wage ratios, they could be a reason for these dier-
ences in estimated magnitudes and the signicance of the eects. Therefore, it is also
doubtful whether the rst composition's nding of eects of dierences in coecients
exclusively for the foreign dummy is correct, which could be interpreted along the lines
of foreign companies paying wage premia in general but of these premia being higher if
the company exports. It may well be that eects of coecients would be signicant for
other covariates as well were it not for the composition being not very suitable given
nonlinearity, outliers and omitted variable bias.
For blue collar wages, the second decomposition gives weak evidence for a dierence in
coecients between rms that trade and those that do not at the 75th and the 90th
percentile. Given that this suggestion is correct, the dierence is considerably smaller
than for white collar wages.
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For white collar wages, the estimated eect of dierences in coecients increases over
quantiles just as the estimated eect of dierences in characteristics are increasing over
quantiles. The same holds true for average wages. This would be an argument for an
eect of coecients for wage ratios as well. However, this is found at quantiles .5, .75
and .9 only for wage ratios, and, though the eects of coecients are estimated to be
stronger than for white collar wages, this is combined with the residual having over-
whelming power in explaining the dierence at quantiles .75 and .9. At these quantiles,
the residuals are estimated to widen the gap, but at the other quantiles, they seem
to decrease it, whilst the eect is estimated to be outstandingly strong at the 25th
percentile. This can well be a result of a linear model tted to a clearly nonlinear de-
pendent variable. Indeed, the estimated eect of residuals is strongest at the quantiles
where the quantile plot of wage ratios shows a sharp increase. Are these estimates for
dierences in residuals an argument against considering the estimates for dierences in
coecients for relative wages as completely uninformative? Whereas their magnitude
is certainly awed, their very regular increase over quantiles combined with the ndings
for absolute wages are reason enough to think that this would be wrong. Additionally,
even though for the decomposition based on OLS, the estimate for the total eect is
obviously awed and insignicant, the detailed decomposition suggests some signicant
eects of dierences in coecients as well.
Thus, it can be concluded there is strong evidence for dierences in wage-setting be-
tween traders and non-traders which clearly favours white collar wages in trading rms.
It is very well possible that the same is true for skill-premia.
7 Conclusion
Theory and empirical evidence suggest that more productive rms select into export-
ing, and, though the body of research is considerably smaller, into importing. Due
to transaction costs of trade, only the more productive rms are found to be able to
compete on a foreign market despite these costs. Only the more productive rms can
aord to incur these transaction costs to gain direct access to imported inputs. Applied
work nds that there is a positive eect of the globalisation decision on wages as well.
Positive eects of importing and exporting at the rm level are attributed to gains of
variety and better quality inputs, positive eects of exporting to access to a larger mar-
ket and thus to productivity-enhancing eects of increased competition. Furthermore,
interaction with a foreign supplier or buyer is seen to stimulate process innovation. A
link to wages is established via rent-sharing, be it through wage bargaining or not.
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Some authors suggest that by savings in transaction costs, exporting and importing
are complementary.
OLS and quantile regression analysis of UNIDO's Africa Investor survey 2010 data
nds strong evidence for a positive eect of trade at the rm level for 20 Subsaharan-
African countries. A large proportion of the eect found for exporting can be attributed
to rm size and to labour productivity. Wage premia paid by importers can to a large
extent be explained by higher labour productivity. There is at best very weak evidence
for complementarity of exporting and importing.
Trade is found to be related to innovation and technology in the widest sense. The-
oretical and empirical works have been dedicated to the skill-biasedness of trade in
this respect. Work that draws the attention to skill-biasedness of rm-level trade fea-
ture less prominently. If skill is complementary to innovation and technology though,
trade induced innovation and access to higher technology through trade form a link
between rm level trade and skill premia. Though results on wage ratios between non-
production and production workers are mixed due to misspecication, consistently
higher estimates of eects on trade for non-production workers are in line with such a
link. Again, causality is not clear. Firms paying higher skill-premia might select into
trade because they are more innovative and they have higher quality products to sell
or because they may simply be more productive by employing higher skilled sta.
If innovation and technology pay more to a company that trades, notably because
the gains from innovation and technology can be reaped on a larger market or because
they can be multiplied by better inputs, complementarity of innovation and technology
to skill might alter wage setting itself. That is, rm characteristics that are related to
wages could pay o dierently for workers in rms that engage in trade, notably for
higher qualied workers. Evidence on the same rm characteristics paying o more for
employees in trading rms is found for non-production wages increasing over quantiles
of the wage distribution but there is little to no eect on wage setting for production
wages. This suggests that skill premia depend more positively on rm characteristics as
well but decomposition results on wage ratios give a somewhat unclear picture. Other
explanations could be thought of for the decomposition results. Most importantly,
absence of variables that control for skill render it impossible to distinguish between
a rm whose workers are more skilled and thus earn higher wages and a rm whose
workers are a little less skilled but whose skills and eort are rewarded more with
higher wages in the rst place. So ndings could also be due to skill-biasedness itself,
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not necessarily to dierences in wage setting. Nonetheless, the entire distributions
of both coecients and endowments of traders are found to dominate those of non-
traders. Such a nding would be unlikely to occur due to measurement problems alone.
The present results provide important insights on dierent eects of exporting and
importing over the whole wage distribution. At the same time, though not giving
denite answers, they shed some interesting light on skill-biasedness of trade.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Trade (any) Importer Exporter Twoway
(trading) (non-trading) (trading) (non-trading) (trading) (non-trading) (trading) (non-trading)
ln Wage avg 7.838 7.62 7.79 7.757 7.902 7.716 7.939 7.724
(.875) (.878) (.831) (.913) (.928) (.856) (.972) (.85)
ln WageBlueCollar 5.017 4.827 4.961 4.955 5.092 4.902 5.132 4.91
(.868) (.781) (.849) (.845) (.887) (.823) (.926) (.817)
ln WageWhiteCollar 5.847 5.508 5.767 5.724 5.954 5.653 5.99 5.674
(.88) (.797) (.862) (.874) (.893) (.844) (.932) (.839)
WhiteToBlue 2.821 2.448 2.75 2.675 2.918 2.617 2.893 2.655
(2.36) (2.387) (2.373) (2.375) (2.34) (2.383) (2.178) (2.422)
ln SizeEmp 4.204 3.312 3.865 3.966 4.664 3.622 4.712 3.714
(1.225) (1.196) (1.08) (1.401) (1.261) (1.165) (1.223) (1.216)
BlueCollar Emp 118.214 49.879 70.203 114.492 183.471 61.262 179.808 74.551
(287.539) (151.907) (222.034) (273.385) (347.514) (194.543) (338.289) (222.413)
WhiteCollar Emp 39.362 27.086 26.762 41.306 56.487 26.905 60.658 28.756
(92.346) (127.104) (61.123) (124.831) (120.597) (95.886) (131.391) (94.936)
RelEmpBlueCollar .691 .679 .679 .692 .706 .679 .709 .681
(.254) (.549) (.265) (.428) (.237) (.415) (.243) (.4)
ln Age 2.71 2.529 2.622 2.674 2.829 2.581 2.878 2.593
(.808) (.784) (.801) (.807) (.804) (.794) (.788) (.799)
SkillRatio 31.352 35.041 32.935 32.216 29.2 33.862 29.021 33.441
(18.286) (21.492) (17.819) (20.394) (18.699) (19.543) (17.818) (19.721)
ln OutputPerHours 2.429 1.603 2.296 2.09 2.611 1.991 2.697 2.03
(1.514) (1.565) (1.421) (1.666) (1.614) (1.525) (1.528) (1.56)
ln CapitalLabourRatio 9.472 8.854 9.363 9.225 9.620 9.138 9.734 9.157
(1.621) (1.701) (1.439) (1.805) (1.831) (1.579) (1.73) (1.633)
ln SizeSales 14.434 12.726 13.951 13.871 15.09 13.413 15.211 13.549
(1.971) (2.101) (1.848) (2.345) (1.944) (2.055) (1.821) (2.11)
Trader: sample mean of trader. Non-trader: sample mean of non-trader. Sample standard deviations in parantheses
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Table 2: Summary statistics - foreign and domestic
(Foreign) (Domestic)
Trade .823 .613
(.381) (.487)
Exporter .449 .204
(.498) (.403)
Importer .374 .409
(.484) (.492)
Twoway .321 .152
(.467) (.359)
ln Wage avg 7.979 7.653
(.815) (.896)
ln WageBlueCollar 5.129 4.862
(.768) (.873)
ln WageWhiteCollar 6.03 5.58
(.830) (.849)
WhiteToBlue 3.07 2.502
(2.667) (2.168)
ln SizeEmp 4.416 3.653
(1.25) (1.221)
BlueCollar Emp 152.839 65.755
(352.133) (172.041)
WhiteCollar Emp 50.85 27.001
(146.065) (70.264)
RelEmpBlueCollar .690 .685
(.2) (.44)
ln Age 2.644 2.659
(.827) (.793)
SkillRatio 30.483 33.626
(18.721) (19.704)
ln OutputPerHours 2.652 1.904
(1.625) (1.484)
ln CapitalLabourRatio 9.59 9.106
(1.794) (1.572)
ln SizeSales 14.862 13.366
(1.955) (2.085)
Sample standard deviations in parantheses
Table 3: KS-tests
Trade (any) Importer Exporter Twoway
(Combined) (trading) (non-trading) (Combined) (trading) (non-trading) (Combined) (trading) (non-trading) (Combined) (trading) (non-trading)
ln Wage avg 0*** 0*** .982 .032** .016** .485 0*** 0*** .997 0*** 0*** .99
ln WageBlueCollar 0*** 0*** .999 .131 .066* .28 0*** 0*** .998 0*** 0*** .994
ln WageWhiteCollar 0*** 0*** .995 .036** .018** .863 0*** 0*** .987 0*** 0*** .988
WhiteToBlue 0*** 0*** .989 .095* .047** .690 0*** 0*** .988 .022** .011** .939
ln SizeEmp 0*** 0*** 1 0*** .001*** 0*** 0*** 0*** .999 0*** 0*** .999
BlueCollar Emp 0*** 0*** 1 0*** .002*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1
WhiteCollar Emp 0*** 0*** .993 .003*** .001*** .025** 0*** 0*** .999 0*** 0*** 1
RelEmpBlueCollar .005*** .002*** .952 .002*** .44 .001*** 0*** 0*** .983 .002*** .001*** .99
ln Age 0*** 0*** 1 .169 .950 .085* 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1
SkillRatio .001*** 1 0*** .002*** .001*** .464 0*** 1 0*** 0*** .999 0***
ln OutputPerHours 0*** 0*** .998 0*** 0*** .094* 0*** 0*** .999 0*** 0*** .999
ln CapitalLabourRatio 0*** 0*** .998 .001*** 0*** .144 0*** 0*** .961 0*** 0*** .991
ln SizeSales 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1
KS-tests between exporters and importers
(Combined) (Exporter) (Importer)
ln Wage avg .027** .013** .988
ln WageBlueCollar 0*** 0*** .995
ln WageWhiteCollar 0*** 0*** .982
WhiteToBlue .091* .046** .789
ln SizeEmp 0*** 0*** .999
BlueCollar Emp 0*** 0*** .999
WhiteCollar Emp 0*** 0*** 1
RelEmpBlueCollar 0*** 0*** .872
ln Age 0*** 0*** .999
SkillRatio 0*** .963 0***
ln OutputPerHours 0*** 0*** .820
ln CapitalLabourRatio 0*** 0*** .323
ln SizeSales 0*** 0*** 1
Combined: Test on equality of distributions. Trader: favourable to trader. Non-trader: favourable to non-trader.
p-values: <.01***, <.05**, .10*
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Table 4: Mean comparison tests
Trade (any) Importer Exporter Twoway
(Combined) (trading) (non-trading) (Combined) (trading) (non-trading) (Combined) (trading) (non-trading) (Combined) (trading) (non-trading)
ln Wage avg 0*** 0*** 1 .329 .165 .835 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1
ln WageBlueCollar 0*** 0*** 1 .849 .425 .575 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1
ln WageWhiteCollar 0*** 0*** 1 .202 .101 .899 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1
WhiteToBlue 0*** 0*** 1 .419 .21 .79 .003*** .001*** .999 .032** .016** .984
ln SizeEmp 0*** 0*** 1 .043** .978 .022** 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1
BlueCollar Emp 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1
WhiteCollar Emp .004*** .002*** .998 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1
RelEmpBlueCollar .443 .221 .779 .387 .806 .194 .087* .043** .957 .111 .055* .945
ln Age 0*** 0*** 1 .102 .949 .051* 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1
SkillRatio 0*** 1 0*** .343 .172 .828 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1 0***
ln OutputPerHours 0*** 0*** 1 .001*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1
ln CapitalLabourRatio 0*** 0*** 1 .034** .017** .983 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1
ln SizeSales 0*** 0*** 1 .345 .173 .827 0*** 0*** 1 0*** 0*** 1
Mean comparison tests by foreign
(Combined) (Foreign) (Domestic)
Trade 0*** 0*** 1
Importer .077* .962 .038**
Exporter 0*** 0*** 1
Twoway 0*** 0*** 1
ln Wage avg 0*** 0*** 1
ln WageBlueCollar 0*** 0*** 1
ln WageWhiteCollar 0*** 0*** 1
WhiteToBlue 0*** 0*** 1
ln SizeEmp 0*** 0*** 1
BlueCollar Emp 0*** 0*** 1
WhiteCollar Emp 0*** 0*** 1
RelEmpBlueCollar .71 .355 .645
ln Age .656 .672 .328
SkillRatio 0*** 1 0***
ln OutputPerHours 0*** 0*** 1
ln CapitalLabourRatio 0*** 0*** 1
ln SizeSales 0*** 0*** 1
Combined: Test on equality of means. Trader: favourable to trader. Non-trader: favourable to non-trader.
p-values: <.01***, <.05**, .10*
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Table 11: Quantile decomposition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Wages Blue Collar Wages White Collar Wages Wage Ratio
b/se/ci95 b/se/ci95 b/se/ci95 b/se/ci95
Dierences between observable distributions
Distributionsq10 -0.234*** -0.125*** -0.260*** -0.121***
(0.047) (0.038) (0.038) (0.034)
[-0.326,-0.141] [-0.200,-0.050] [-0.335,-0.185] [-0.188,-0.054]
Distributionsq25 -0.220*** -0.188*** -0.303*** -0.142***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.035)
[-0.285,-0.154] [-0.249,-0.128] [-0.370,-0.236] [-0.210,-0.073]
Distributionsq50 -0.235*** -0.212*** -0.382*** -0.296***
(0.032) (0.029) (0.036) (0.054)
[-0.298,-0.172] [-0.268,-0.156] [-0.453,-0.312] [-0.402,-0.191]
Distributionsq75 -0.202*** -0.213*** -0.381*** -0.618***
(0.045) (0.041) (0.048) (0.092)
[-0.291,-0.114] [-0.292,-0.133] [-0.476,-0.286] [-0.798,-0.438]
Distributionsq90 -0.092 -0.127* -0.329*** -0.840***
(0.070) (0.066) (0.062) (0.211)
[-0.229,0.045] [-0.256,0.002] [-0.450,-0.207] [-1.252,-0.427]
Eect of characteristics
Characteristics q10 -0.207*** -0.122*** -0.212*** -0.082***
(0.033) (0.029) (0.033) (0.030)
[-0.272,-0.142] [-0.178,-0.066] [-0.278,-0.146] [-0.140,-0.024]
Characteristics q25 -0.190*** -0.159*** -0.231*** -0.151***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.031) (0.030)
[-0.247,-0.133] [-0.208,-0.110] [-0.291,-0.170] [-0.209,-0.093]
Characteristics q50 -0.191*** -0.151*** -0.263*** -0.194***
(0.029) (0.022) (0.032) (0.042)
[-0.247,-0.135] [-0.195,-0.108] [-0.324,-0.201] [-0.277,-0.112]
Characteristics q75 -0.206*** -0.177*** -0.306*** -0.249***
(0.034) (0.030) (0.035) (0.073)
[-0.273,-0.140] [-0.236,-0.117] [-0.375,-0.237] [-0.393,-0.105]
Characteristics q90 -0.206*** -0.189*** -0.317*** -0.342**
(0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.169)
[-0.305,-0.106] [-0.285,-0.093] [-0.414,-0.220] [-0.672,-0.012]
Eect of coecients
Coecients q10 -0.050 -0.014 -0.128*** -0.089
(0.041) (0.031) (0.048) (0.074)
[-0.131,0.031] [-0.076,0.048] [-0.222,-0.033] [-0.233,0.056]
Coecients q25 -0.069* -0.021 -0.140*** -0.107
(0.040) (0.033) (0.051) (0.075)
[-0.147,0.009] [-0.085,0.043] [-0.240,-0.040] [-0.255,0.040]
Coecients q50 -0.092** -0.053 -0.152*** -0.173**
(0.045) (0.035) (0.057) (0.085)
[-0.179,-0.004] [-0.121,0.015] [-0.263,-0.040] [-0.339,-0.006]
Coecients q75 -0.101* -0.080* -0.133* -0.164*
(0.053) (0.042) (0.069) (0.098)
[-0.204,0.002] [-0.162,0.001] [-0.267,0.001] [-0.356,0.027]
Coecients q90 -0.105* -0.094** -0.141* -0.171*
(0.061) (0.046) (0.077) (0.100)
[-0.225,0.015] [-0.183,-0.005] [-0.292,0.010] [-0.367,0.025]
Eect of residuals
Residuals q10 0.023 0.011 0.080* 0.049
(0.041) (0.038) (0.048) (0.070)
[-0.056,0.103] [-0.064,0.085] [-0.014,0.173] [-0.088,0.187]
Residuals q25 0.039 -0.008 0.068* 0.116**
(0.029) (0.026) (0.040) (0.059)
[-0.019,0.096] [-0.060,0.044] [-0.012,0.147] [0.001,0.232]
Residuals q50 0.047* -0.008 0.032 0.070*
(0.024) (0.020) (0.031) (0.039)
[-0.000,0.095] [-0.047,0.031] [-0.029,0.092] [-0.007,0.148]
Residuals q75 0.105*** 0.044 0.058 -0.205**
(0.035) (0.036) (0.043) (0.090)
[0.035,0.174] [-0.026,0.114] [-0.027,0.143] [-0.381,-0.029]
Residuals q90 0.218*** 0.156** 0.129* -0.326
(0.070) (0.072) (0.077) (0.283)
[0.081,0.355] [0.014,0.298] [-0.022,0.281] [-0.881,0.229]
Observations NoTrade 853 853 853 853
Observations Trade 1885 1885 1885 1885
bootstrap standard errors (1075 replications). Pointwise condence intervals
76
Table 12: Bootstrap inference
Average Wages Blue Collar Wages White Collar Wages Wage Ratio
P-values P-values P-values P-values
Null-hypothesis KS-statistic CMS-statistic KS-statistic CMS-statistic KS-statistic CMS-statistic KS-statistic CMS-statistic
Correct specication of the parametric model 0 .40186 .375814 .943256 .898605 .76 .504186 .48 .556279
Correct specication of the parametric model 1 .623256 .572093 .698605 .446512 .531163 .464186 .389767 .523721
Dierences between the observable distributions
No eect: QE(tau)=0 for all taus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Constant eect: QE(tau)=QE(0.5) for all taus .055814 .151628 .097674 .105116 .017674 .011163 0 0
Stochastic dominance: QE(tau)>0 for all taus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stochastic dominance: QE(tau)<0 for all taus .806512 .806512 .822326 .822326 .849302 .849302 .84 .84
Eects of characteristics
No eect: QTE(tau)=0 for all taus .00093 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Constant eect: QE(tau)=QE(0.5) for all taus .765581 .76186 .568372 .421395 .261395 .092093 .028837 .051163
Stochastic dominance: QE(tau)>0 for all taus .00093 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stochastic dominance: QE(tau)<0 for all taus .793488 .793488 .821395 .821395 .822326 .822326 .813023 .813023
Eects of coecients
No eect: QE(tau)=0 for all taus .104186 .083721 .111628 .131163 .021395 .017674 .097674 .093953
Constant eect: QE(tau)=QE(0.5) for all taus .302326 .306047 .088372 .026047 .724651 .621395 .058605 .07814
Stochastic dominance: QE(tau)>0 for all taus .014884 0 .085581 .017674 .00093 0 .033488 0
Stochastic dominance: QE(tau)<0 for all taus .749767 .749767 .60093 .60093 .738605 .738605 .671628 .671628
Eects of residuals
No eect: QE(tau)=0 for all taus .015814 .014884 .16093 .305116 .325581 .116279 .095814 .042791
Constant eect: QE(tau)=QE(0.5) for all taus .036279 .054884 .066977 .103256 .391628 .213023 .009302 .034419
Stochastic dominance: QE(tau)>0 for all taus .933023 .933023 .597209 .705116 .903256 .903256 .032558 .415814
Stochastic dominance: QE(tau)<0 for all taus .00093 .00093 .126512 .225116 .083721 .009302 .113488 .106047
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9 Abstract
Using the UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010 data on manufacturing companies in 20
sub-Saharan African countries, the rm-level eect of importing intermediate inputs
and exporting on production and non-production wages as well as relative wages is
explored using OLS and quantile regression. There is strong support for a positive
relationship for both production and non-production wages as well as for wage ratios.
Eects of importing are found to be due to dierences in labour productivity to a
great extent. The eect found for exporting are due to dierences in size and labour
productivity. Both these eects vary over dierent quantiles of the wage distribution.
The hypothesis of skill-biasedness of trade resulting in dierent wage-setting functions
for traders and non-traders is tested using decomposition methods. There is strong
evidence for dierences in wage-setting that favour white collar wages in trading rms.
However, evidence is mixed on whether the estimated eects go from trade to wages
or whether high-wage rms select into trade.
10 Zusammenfassung
Anhand von UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010 - Daten ueber die verarbeitende
Industrie in 20 Subsahara-afrikanischen Laendern wird der Eekt des Imports interme-
diaerer Gueter und Exports von Fertigguetern auf die Loehne von Produktionsarbeit-
erInnen, Loehne von technischen, administrativen und leitenden Angestellten sowie auf
relative Loehne auf Firmenebene mittels OLS und Quantilregression untersucht. Die
Ergebnisse weisen auf eine deutlich positive Beziehung zwischen Handel und Loehnen
von ProduktionsarbeiterInnen, Loehnen von Angestellten und relativen Loehnen hin.
Die geschaetzten Eekte von Importen koennen zum groeten Teil durch Produktivi-
taetsunterschiede erklaert werden, waehrend die fuer Exporte gefundenen Eekte mit
Firmengroee und Produktivitaet in Relation stehen. Beide Eekte unterscheiden sich
stark ueber die Quantile der Lohnverteilung hinweg. Mit Hilfe von Zerlegungen wird
getestet, ob ein moeglicher Skill Bias im Handel zu unterschiedlichen Lohnsetzungs-
funktionen fuer handel- bzw. nicht handeltreibende Firmen fuehrt. Die empirischen
Befunde deuten stark auf Unterschiede zugunsten von Angestellten in handeltreibenden
Firmen hin. Die Analyse gibt jedoch keinen genauen Aufschluss darueber, ob Handel
Loehne beeinusst oder ob die Gruende, aus denen Firmen hoehere Loehne zahlen,
ebenso dazu fuehren, dass Firmen mit hoeheren Lohnniveaus eher Handel treiben.
79
11 Curriculum Vitae
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Date of Birth 27/12/1985
Citizenship German
Contact address anna.pauls [at] gmail.com
EDUCATION
October 2005 | present Vienna University
Economics
October 2009 | present Vienna University
Sinology (MA)
October 2005 | June 2009 Vienna University
Sinology (Bakk. phil.)
March 2005 Max-Planck-Gymnasium Trier
Abitur
October 2003 | February 2005 University of Trier
Chinese language classes
July | August 2004 Beijing Language and Culture University
Chinese language classes (Scholarship of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China to Germany)
